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IV 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. LARGE, 
Applicant/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, HOWARD 
TRUCKING OF UTAH INC., 
INC., and/or STATE INSURANCE 
FUND and THE SECOND INJURY 
FUND, 
Defendants/Respondent. 
Industrial Commission 
Case No. 85000759 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Court of Appeals No.: 
870437-CA 
Priority No. 6 
I. STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND 
DESCRIBING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Sections 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16, Utah Code Ann., confer 
jurisdiction of this matter on the Court of Appeals. The 
plaintiff has sought review ot an Order ot the Industrial 
Commission of Utah which denied his Motion for Review ot an 
Administrative Law Judge's denial of permanent total disability 
benefits and affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's denial of 
benefits. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, hereafter referred to 
as "the Fund," submits that the only issues this review presents 
are 1) whether there is a foundation in the evidence for the 
findings of the Industrial Commission of Utah (hereafter referred 
to as "the Commission") and the findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge; and, 2) whether one whose disability is independent of his 
work-related injury can be awarded benefits for permanent total 
disability. 
III. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Statutes, cases, and authorities believed to be determinative 
of the respective issues raised include §§ 35-1-45 and 35-1-67, 
Utah Code Ann., Hodges v, Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 
718 (Utah 1986); Brundaoe v. IML Freight, Inc.. 622 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1980); and 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 57.51(a) 
at 10-164.65 through 10-164.84(18), § 59-22(a) & (b) at 10-376 
through 10-395. These authorities are set forth verbatim in the 
addenda hereto. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case 
This case involves the denial of the appellant's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits. There is no issue as to the 
appellant's disability, as the administrative law judge below 
found that the appellant is unemployable and the Commission 
adopted his finding. Nor is there any issue as to whether the 
appellant suffered an accident in the course of his employment for 
which permanent total disability benefits could be extended. The 
administrative law judge found, and the Commission accepted the 
finding, that although the appellant was injured while in the 
process of applying for employment, the purposes ot the workers1 
compensation laws were served by extending coverage for medical 
expenses, impairment, and impairment or loss of bodily function 
2 
reasonably attributable to the incident. The dispute before the 
Court arises over the question of whether the appellant is 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of the work related 
injury and certain preexisting impairments, in which case he 
would be eligible for benefits, or, as the administrative law 
judge found and the Commission affirmed, the appellant's 
disability is due to his over-all unemployability which was not 
changed materially by the industrial injury, in which case 
benefits were rightfully denied* 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The proceedings began in 1985, when the appellant filed an 
application for hearing with the Commission. In his application, 
appellant claimed medical expenses, compensation for time off 
work, permanent partial disability benefits, and permanent total 
disability benefits due to an accident which occurred March 25, 
1985, while he was taking a driver's test as part of his 
application for employment with Howard Trucking of Utah, Inc. The 
Fund, as Howard Trucking of Utah, Inc.'s workers' compensation 
carrier, denied the appellant's claims on the grounds that he was 
not an employee of its insured at the time of the incident and 
medical reports it received indicated the appellant would be able 
to return to work. The appellant's claims were heard before 
Administrative Law Judge Richard Sumsion on April 22, 1986. On 
the basis of a memorandum of law submitted to him by appellant's 
attorney, Judge Sumsion determined that the workers' compensation 
act should b£ liberally construed to provide protection to one who 
3 
is injured during a try-out period required as a pre-requisite to 
employment. Judge Sumsion awarded appellant temporary total 
disability compensation tor one year and ordered the payment ot 
all appellant's medical expenses incurred as the result of his 
accident. The judge also ordered that a determination of 
appellant's claim for permanent total disability compensation be 
deferred pending receipt of additional medical information and/or 
a medical panel evaluation. 
On April 17, 1987, appellant's counsel submitted results ot a 
lumbar spine study, made of appellant on February 6, 1987, to 
Judge Sumsion and requested a hearing for a permanent total 
disability determination. Judge Sumsion responded by entering 
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
July 28, 1987. The judge found a hearing to be unnecessary, 
stating that there was sufticient evidence on the record to deal 
with the issues at hand. In his Order, he awarded appellant 
compensation for permanent partial disability and allocated all 
benefits and medical expenses equally between The Fund and the 
Second Injury Fund, but denied appellant's claim for permanent 
total disability. On August 12, 1987, the appellant filed a 
motion for review ot the July 28, 1987 order. 
C. Disposition by the Industrial Commission 
The Commission denied appellant's motion for review and 
affirmed the administrative law judge's July 28, 1987 Supplemental 
Order. 
4 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The relevant facts, and their location in the record, are as 
follows: 
The appellant was born on May 1, 1923 (R 3), He was employed 
as a truck driver for approximately forty years (R 37). During 
his years of employment, he suffered several industrial injuries 
which required medical treatment, including a lumbar laminectomy 
at disc levels L2, L3 and L4 in 1953 (R 59-63, R 124, R 166). His 
doctors refer to him as obese, and he has weighed at least 325 
pounds for the past ten years (R 42, R 103, R 109). 
The last year in which appellant was employed as a truck 
driver was 1982 (R 37). He has not been employed on any 
consistent basis since 1982 (R 15, R 37, R 69). On March 25, 
1985, he sought employment as a truck driver with Howard Trucking 
of Utah, Inc. in St. George, Utah (R 40). He was asked to take a 
driving test (R 41). The clutch in the truck which he was to 
drive was out of adjustment and he was asked to drive it to a 
service bay for repair and climb out (R 13- 14). Exiting the 
truck, the appellant fell, landing on the floor on his back (R 
14). He was transported by ambulance to Dixie Medical Center's 
emergency room for x-rays and treatment (R 14, R 104-107). The x-
rays did not reveal any fracture in his back, and the emergency 
room doctor prescribed twenty-four hours' bed rest, pain 
medication, and, if appellant were not better in three to four 
days, an orthopedic evaluation, but the doctor also anticipated 
the appellant could return to work in two days. (Id.) Lawrence 
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Howard, of Howard Trucking, retrieved appellant from the medical 
center and drove him back to Howard Trucking, where he had parked 
his own truck (R 17). Appellant spent the night in a St. George 
motel and drove himself to Phoenix, Arizona, where he lives, the 
next day (R 50). 
On A p r i l 6 , 1 9 8 5 , a p p e l l a n t saw h i s family p h y s i c i a n , 
complaining ot pain in h is lower back (R 108). The record i s not 
absolu te ly c l e a r , but from a p p e l l a n t ' s testimony i t appears t h i s 
p h y s i c i a n had been t r e a t i n g a p p e l l a n t for back pa in s i n c e 
approx imate ly 1982 (R 49, R 68) . On April 23, 1985, appe l lan t 
saw a r a d i o l o g i s t who r e p o r t e d x - r a y s r evea l ed a compression 
f rac tu re of the superior aspect of L3 in a p p e l l a n t ' s back (R 113). 
The r ad io log i s t wrote, 
Reac t ive s c l e r o s i s i s p r e s e n t and sugges t s 
t h a t t h i s may be of some a g e , bu t t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y of new, compression superimposed 
on old changes must be considered. 
Sometime before May 28, 1985, appel lant f i l ed h is claim for 
workers' compensation benef i t s to r the March 25, 1985, in jury (R 
1 ) . On December 18 , 1985, he saw an o r t h o p e d i c surgeon, who 
reported on h is condi t ion , in p a r t , as fol lows: 
x-rays taken today of the lumbar spine reveal 
advanced ev idence of a r t h r o s i s ; t he r e i s a 
suggestion of a compression f rac ture involving 
the t h i r d lumbar segment with compression a t 
i t s midportion and approximately [s ic] loss ot 
height of approximately 50 percen t . There i s 
a l s o a d v a n c e d f a c e t a r t h r i t i s p r e s e n t 
throughout the lumbar segment. 
Impression: S t a t u s p o s t c o m p r e s s i o n 
fracture, third lumbar vertebra 
with approximately 50 percent 
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of actual loss of height of the 
lumbar body. 
S t a t u s pos t i n d u s t r i a l injury 
March 25 , 1985, with a severe 
r i g h t l u m b o s a c r a l s p r a i n ; 
c o m p r e s s i o n f r a c t u r e of the 
l u m b o v e r t e b r a w i t h 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 50 p e r c e n t 
compression. 
This p a t i e n t , I do not f e e l , 
can ever r e tu rn to h is normal 
occupa t ion as a truck d r i v e r . 
He d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o be 
comple te ly s t a t i o n a r y a t t h i s 
point as discomfort p e r s i s t s 
. . . Once he i s deemed 
s t a t i o n a r y , then I d e f i n i t e l y 
f e e l he h a s a p e r m a n e n t 
p h y s i c a l impairment. I would 
es t imate i t to be of 10 percent 
of the whole man. 
(R 124-125). Each of the medical records quoted above were placed 
in evidence dur ing a p p e l l a n t ' s hearing before Judge Sumsion on 
April 22, 1986. After the hear ing, Judge Sumsion wrote to two of 
the t r e a t i n g phys ic ians request ing c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the medical 
r e c o r d s (R 1 6 0 - 1 6 3 ) . He asked the o r t h o p e d i c surgeon the 
following spec i f i c ques t ions : 
1. I s t h e 10% r a t i n g for permanent 
p h y s i c a l impairment a t t r i b u t a b l e 
s o l e l y t o Mr. L a r g e ' s i n j u r y of 
March 25, 1985? 
2. What p e r c e n t a g e r a t i n g would you 
a s s i g n t o p e r m a n e n t p h y s i c a l 
i m p a i r m e n t a t t r i b u t a b l e t o Mr. 
Large 's condit ion p r io r to March 25, 
1985? This would obviously include 
any res idua l s from his 1953 surgery 
and poss ibly other problems as wel l . 
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3 . Your impressions on page 2 of your 
report are s t a t ed in two paragraphs. 
I c a n ' t t e l l if the f i r s t p e r t a i n s 
t o p r e - e x i s t i n g condi t ions and the 
s e c o n d t o t h e r e s u l t s of t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l in ju ry , or i f the second 
i s m e r e l y a r e - s t a t e m e n t of the 
f i r s t . 
4 . Did the i n j u r y of March 25, 1985, 
d i r e c t l y aggrava te the Appl ican t ' s 
p r e - e x i s t i n g condit ion and, if so , 
in what way? 
5. What i s t h e a p p r o x i m a t e da t e on 
w h i c h you b e l i e v e Mr. L a r g e ' s 
c o n d i t i o n s h o u l d be d e e m e d 
s t a t i ona ry? 
6. As ide from t h e CT scan you have 
sugges ted for d i agnos t i c purposes, 
i s t h e r e any medical t reatment the 
Appl ican t i s l i k e l y to need in the 
f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e as a r e s u l t of 
h is March 25, 1985 injury? 
(R 160, 161). The surgeon 's response to the quest ions was: 
At t h i s p o i n t , to answer your 4 ques t ions , I 
f e e l t h a t t h e f a l l i n March d i r e c t l y 
a g g r a v a t e d t h e p a t i e n t ' s p r e e x i s t i n g 
c o n d i t i o n , a l t h o u g h , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s 
t e s t imony he was qu i t e a c t i v e . The p a t i e n t 
a l s o has a 10% permanent physical impairment judging from his previous laminectomy surgery 
which c e r t a i n l y con t r ibu tes to what I feel i s 
now a permanent physical impairment since the 
p a t i e n t d o e s h a v e a l o s s of s t r e n g t h , 
e s p e c i a l l y of t h e r i g h t lower e x t r e m i t y , 
r a t h e r s e v e r e d i scomfor t extending from the 
lumbar sp ine . I would give i t approximately 
5% due t o t h e p a t i e n t ' s p r e v i o u s lumbar 
surgery, performed in 1953. This surgery was 
done for hernia ted lumbar d i s c . 
(R 167). Judge Sumsion received no response to quest ions he posed 
to the other physician (R 162-165). In his f indings of fact and 
conc lus ions of law of September 3, 1986, Judge Sumsion spoke of 
the a p p e l l a n t ' s medical records and d i s a b i l i t y as fol lows: 
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The v a r i o u s m e d i c a l r e p o r t s a r e h i g h l y 
s u g g e s t i v e of some r e s i d u a l impairment trom 
the a p p l i c a n t ' s i n d u s t r i a l accident and they 
c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e e x t e n s i v e p r e - e x i s t i n g 
impairment from p r i o r back prob lems . The 
appl icant underwent a three leve l laminectomy 
in 1953
 F and the cut lent evidence of ar thros is 
and advance f a c e t a r t h r i t i s th roughout the 
lumbar segment a re probably a t t r i b u t a b l e to 
h i s old i n j u r y and the d e t e r i o r a t i o n which 
would be expected to r e s u l t therefrom. No 
definitive information jg available as to the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of permanent impairment r e su l t ing 
from the i n d u s t r i a l accident but Dr. Barbosa 
i s of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t did 
aggrava te the p r e - e x i s t i n g condit ion and he 
be l ieves some res idua l impairment did r e s u l t . 
A CT span or other diagnostic work up could 
probably be done in order t o p rov ide more 
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e c a u s e and e f f e c t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s 
i n d u s t r i a l accident and h is current problems. 
The a p p l i c a n t ' s h e a r i n g t o o k p l a c e 
approximately 13 months after his accident of 
March 25 , 1985. At tha t t ime, he t e s t i f i e d 
that he s t i l l felt unable to return to workt 
On the other hand, based on the nature of h is 
i n j u r y , i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t h i s c o n d i t i o n 
would not have s t a b i l i z e d w i th in one year 
a f t e r t h e d a t e of h i s i n j u r y . The 
Admin i s t r a t i ve law Judge recognizes tha t the 
determination of temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y i s 
a medical d e t e r m i n a t i o n , but on an in ter im 
basis believes compensation should be awarded 
for a t l e a s t a one year period of time u n t i l 
more d e f i n i t i v e information can be obtained. 
S i m i l a r l y , the medical expenses incurred by 
the a p p l i c a n t t o da t e appear reasonable and 
should be paid in accordance with the Medical 
and Surgical Fee Schedule of the Commission, 
The a p p l i c a n t i s e n t i t l e d Lu w u i k e i i 1 
c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s as a r e s u l t of h i s 
i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t of March 25 , 1985, in 
acco rdance with the fo regoing f i n d i n g s of 
f a c t . I t i s recognized tha t he had not yet 
been o f fe red employment b^ Huvvard Trucking 
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Company but under the authorities cited and 
the rational advanced on applicant's behalf by 
his attorneyf the Administrative Law Judge 
believes the Workers' Compensation Act should 
be extended so as to include coverage for the 
applicant's injury. The applicant should also 
receive compensation for permanent partial 
impairment if the evidence ultimately shows 
that he sustained some permanent partial 
impairment as a result of his industrial 
accident. It may be an entirely different 
matter as to whether applicant can assert a 
claim for permanent total disability but there 
are too many unresolved issues at this time to 
allow consideration of any claim for permanent 
total disability* Although there are cases in 
other jurisdictions that have accorded 
workers' compensation benefits to a 
prospective employee who was injured during a 
try-out period/ there is no known precedent in 
any jurisdiction for awarding permanent total 
disability benefits to one who is in fact a 
non-employee. Further diagnostic work up 
should be accomplished in this case and should 
at least include a CT scan as suggested by Dr. 
Barbosa. This should be at the expense of the 
defendants. 
(R 171/ 172)/ emphasis added.) 
On April 17f 1987r the appellant made his claim for permanent 
total disability based on "his severe injuries, his limited 
educational background and his age (64 years old)11 (R 177). To 
support his claim, he forwarded the results of a February 6, 1987 
study of his lumbar spine. In pertinent part/ the lumbar study 
states: 
M o d e r a t e d e g e n e r a t i v e c h a n g e s a r e s een 
throughout the lumbar spine and there i s facet 
j o i n t h y p e r t r o p h y and a r t h r i t i c d i s e a s e 
demonst ra ted a t the L4-L5 and L5-S1 l eve l s 
w i th even a s u g g e s t i o n of p o s s i b l e lumbar 
s t e n o s i s p o s t e r i o r l y a t t h e L5 l e v e l . 
N a r r o w i n g of t h e L4 - L 5 a n d L 5 - S 1 
i n t e r v e r t e b r a l d i s c spaces i s demonstrated. 
There i s compression of the superior ve r t eb ra l 
body p l a t of L3, but t h i s appears to be an old 
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c o m p r e s s i o n f r a c t u r e . A s s o c i a t e d n a r r o w i n g of 
t h e L 2 - L 3 i n t e r v e r t e b r a l d i s c s p a c e i s 
d e m o n s t r a t e d * S c a t t e r e d v a s c u l a r 
c a l c i f i c a t i o n s a i: e n o t e d i n t h e d i s t a l 
a b d o m i n a l a o r t a . The s a c r o i l i a c j o i n t s r ema in 
o p e n . S u t u r e s a r e n o t e d p o s t e r i o r t o t h e 
l ower lumbar s p i n e and uppe r sac rum i n d i c a t i ng 
p r e v i o u s s u r g e r y . 
IMPRESSION: 
1 . M o d e r a t e d e g e n e r a t i v e c h a n g e s t h r o u g h o u t 
t h e l u m b a r s p i n e w i t h b i l a t e r a l f a c e t 
h y p e r t r o p h y and a r t h r i t i c d i s e a s e a t t h e L4-L5 
and L5-S1 l e v e l s . T h e r e i s a p o s s i b i l i t y of 
s p i n a l s t e n o s i s a t t h e L5 l e v e l . T h i s c o u l d 
b e b e t t e r e v a l u a t e d b y m e a n ? -£ ^ m •• 
e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e lumbar s p i n e . 
2 . P a r t i a l c o m p r e s s i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e 
s u p e r i o r v e r t e b r a l b o d y p l a t e of L3 w i t h 
a s s o c i a t e d n a r r o w i n g o f t h e L 2 - L 3 
i n t e r v e r t e b r a l d i s c s p a c e . A l l Qf t h i s 
a p p e a r s t o r e p r e s e n t o l d c o m p r e s s i o n f r a c t u r e . 
(R l~rf, e m p h a s i s addec ; 
a i 11" s c ] a i in, I n d o i n g s c h e 
made t h e . i i w>*
 t . <, , e t J» * b ^ c i f i e f i nd i n g s of f a c .t and 
c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w : 
[T]he A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge f i n d s t h e s l i p -
a n d - f a l l i n c i d e n t Q$ March 2 5 , 1 9 8 5 , was 
c l e a r l y t h e i m m e d i a t e c a u s e of t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s 
b a c k p a i n , b u t t h a t i n j u r y a p p e a r s t o have 
c o n t r i b u t e d r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e t o t h e 
a p p l i c a n t ' s p r e s e n t d i s a b i l i t y . H i s 
d i s a b i l i t y i s q u i t e c l e a r l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o 
h i s a d v a n c e d a a e and l a c k of t r a n s f e r a b l e 
s k i l l s and o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y t o h i s p h y s i c a l 
impajgmentSt Had the incident Q£ Harch 25 , 
1 9 8 5 f n e v e r o c c u r r e d , t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s 
d i s a b i l i t y s t a t u s w o u l d be l i t t l e c h a n g e d . 
T h e a p p l i c a n t ' s a g e , o b e s i t y , l a c k of 
t r a n s f e r r a b l e s k i l l s and p r i o r back s u r g e r y 
o b v i o u s l y c o n s t i t u t e t h e d o m i n a n t c a u s e of h i s 
p r e s e n t d i s a b i l i t y . The i n c i d e n t of March 2 5 , 
1 9 8 5 , c o n t r i b u t e s r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e . He 
a p p e a r s t o h a v e s u s t a i n e d a c o m p r e s s i o n 
f r a c t u r e o£ t h e 1 uin,bo v e r t e b r a e c h a r a c t e r i z e d 
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by some weakness in the r igh t lower extremity 
and d i s c o m f o r t e x t e n d i n g trom h i s lumbar 
sp ine . The i n i t i a l evaluat ion a t the hosp i t a l 
IP St t George r Utah was n e g a t i v e for any 
f r a c t u r e s . He was released the same day, he 
was able to drive back to his home in Arizona 
t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y . He d i d no t o b t a i n 
a d d i t i o n a l medical care in Phoenix u n t i l ten 
days l a t e r . 
By the p r io r Order of September 3 , 1986, the 
a p p l i c a n t has been compensa t ed f o r h i s 
medical expenses r ea sonab ly a t t r i b u t a b l e to 
the inc ident of March 25, 1985, for a lengthy 
p e r i o d of t e m p o r a r y t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y , 
e x t e n d i n g f o r o n e f u l l y e a r . The 
Administrat ive Law Judge be l ieves compensation 
i s warranted for permanent p a r t i a l impairment 
reasonably a t t r i b u t a b l e to the March 25, 1985, 
i nc iden t . With payment of t h i s compensation, 
t h e a p p l i c a n t w i l l h a v e b e e n f a i r l y 
compensated for the i n c i d e n t of March 2 5 , 
1985. I t does not follow tha t the a p p l i c a n t ' s 
c la im for d i s a b i l i t y should be predicated on 
the same bas i s as h is claim for the immediate 
consequences of h i s a c c i d e n t of March 2 5 , 
1985, D i s a b i l i t y and personal injury are not 
synonymous terms. Personal injury r e l a t e s to 
t h e a c c i d e n t . D i s a b i l i t y r e l a t e s t o the 
a p p l i c a n t ' s e m p l o y a b i l i t y . The dominant 
r e a s o n , or proximate cause of h i s d i s a b i l i t y 
i s h i s a g e , l a c k of e d u c a t i o n , l a c k of 
t r ans fe rab le s k i l l s and p r e - ex i s t i ng Physical 
condi t ions to which the res idua l e f fec t of the 
i n j u r y of March 2 5 , 1 9 8 5 , c o n t r i b u t e s 
r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e . 
The appl icant should receive compensation for 
p e r m a n e n t p a r t i a l impa i rment , based on a 
r a t i n g of 10% of t h e w h o l e man . . 
A d d i t i o n a l compensat ion by way of permanent 
t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y should not be made inasmuch 
as the proximate or dominate cause of the 
a p p l i c a n t ' s present unemployability i s not the 
r e s u l t of the accident t ha t occurred on March 
25, 1985. 
(R 184, 185, emphasis added.) 
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In denying a p p l i c a n t ' s motion for review ap>, u t i i r m i n g Judge 
Sumsion 's f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , t he Commission s t a t e d : 
The Commission f i nds the only i s s u e on review 
i s w h e t h e r t h e a p p l i c a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o 
p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s . The 
i s s u e r e g a r d i n g what kind of c ausa l connec t ion 
t h e r e must be be tween t h e i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y 
and t h e p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y has not 
b e e n a d d r e s s e d t o d a t e by t h e Commiss ion . 
What causes impairment i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t i s 
e a s i e r t o answer by r e f e r e n c e t o a medical 
o p i n i o n . Wha t c a u s e s d i s a b i l i t y on a 
pe rmanen t b a s i s i s not so e a s i l y p i n p o i n t e d . 
T h e C o m m i s s i o n m u s t a g r e e w i t h t h e 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge t h a t U.C.A. 35-1-67 
i m p l i e s t h e r e m u s t be c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n 
be tween t h e i n j u r y and t h e p e r m a n e n t t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y . The C o m m i s s i o n f i n d s i t i s 
l o g i c a l t o p r e s u m e t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e 
i n t e n d e d permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s 
for those employees whose d i s a b i l i t i e s r e s u l t 
due t o an i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y and not due t o a 
l o n g l i s t of o t h e r f a c t o r s . The concept of 
proximate cause s e r v e s t h e purpose of a l lowing 
those whose d i s a b i l i t i e s a r e t r u l y the r e s u l t 
of t h e i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y t o be p r o p e r l y 
c o m p e n s a t i o n [ s i c ] That c o n c e p t may a l s o 
e l i m i n a t e s o m e i n d u s t r i a l l y i n j u r e d 
i n d i v i d u a l s from p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y 
compe nsa t i o n , bi .11 w i ] J no t : e 1 i m i na I: e t hose 
i n d i v i d u a l s f o r o t h e r k i n d s of w o r k e r s ' 
compensation b e n e f i t s . This r e s u l t seems both 
l o g i c a l and f a i r t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n and 
t h e r e t o r e t he Commisison f s i c l must a f f i rm t h e 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e ' s a d o p t i o n of the 
p r o x i m a t e c a u s e t h e o r y a s i t a p p l i e s t o 
UyC.A. 3 5 - l - 6 7 f As r e s u l t , t h e Commission 
must deny t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s Motion for Review. 
{P 190, emphasis added ) . 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. The argument in Point I is that the only issues 
before the Court are whether or not there is foundation in the 
evidence for tl le Commission's findings and whether or 1 lot one 
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whose disability and unemployability are caused by factors 
independent of an industrial injury can be awarded permanent total 
disability workers' compensation. 
The following arguments address, in order, the points raised 
in appellant's brief* Respondent's last point, however, addresses 
both appellant's Point Five and Point Six, because respondent 
believes these points are repetitive* 
POINT II, The argument made in Point II is that the 
appellant misconstrues the record and the issues before the Court 
by assuming that the fact appellant was not an employee at the 
time of the March 25, 1985, incident was a reason tor the denials 
of benefits and review. Neither the administrative law judge's 
nor the Commission's decision was based on that fact. 
POINT III. The argument in Point III is that there is no 
inconsistency in the decisions in issue. The denials of benefits 
and review were based on the fact that the evidence, taken in the 
light most favorable to the appellant, supported the findings that 
appellant incurred medical expenses, temporary total disability, 
and permanent partial impairment due to a compensable accident, 
but that appellant's permanent total disability is not compensable 
because it is a result of factors independent of the injury and is 
not on account of or a result of the injury incident. 
POINT IV. The argument in Point IV is that nothing in the 
workers' compensation statutes or in the purposes which inform 
them requires an employer to be the general insurer of and payor 
of benefits to employees. Medical expenses and benefits are paid 
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only when the evidence shows they are called for "on account of 
the injury" "by accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment • " 
POINT V, The argument in Point V is that when a degenerative 
condition or pre-existinq infirmity independents ; oduces all or 
part of t permanent incapacity, an employer I iicse employ the 
employee suffers ;-. ast accident does n * • ^ ccme lia;.t all 
m e ci! i c a 1 e x pe n s e s . •* * • 
POINT VI, rgumer •. 1 i~ "hat- -~ie --y be 
permanent! y total ' ^isa^ ^" •- •- - r ; condit on of 
a b j e c! h e .1 p 1 e s s i: - ^  . 111 e 
conclusion that the appellant wa:> memployabie mdeper iiont i and 
before the accident in issue• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY DOES NOT ENTITLE 
HIM TO WORKERS1 COMPENSATION BENEFITS IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND IS IN 
ACCORD WITH THE LAW; ACCORDING TO THE 
STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW, THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSIONfS DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The s t a n d a r d s f o r r e v i e w of d e c i s i o n s of t h e I n d u s t r i a l 
Commission gran*- or^^f d e f e r e n c e t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s f i n d i n g s and 
d i s c o u r a g e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h i t s o r d e r s u n l e s s i t s c o n c l u s i o n s 
appeai : : :oi it .] -ar} t .< :• 1 i i * | lodges ^ 'Western P i l i n g it. iiL&j^Liuii. CQ. , 
71 7 P . 2d 718 , ? 20 (U t a I i 1 9 8 6 ) ; Savage v . I n d u s t r i a l Commission , 
565 P . 2 d 7 8 2 , 783 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) . In Clark v . I n t e r s t a t e Homes, 
I n c . , 'LN , i u\ t,eme C o u r t s t a t e d ; 
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It is fundamental that a determination as to 
permanent disability is a factual question for 
the Commission to resolve, and that 
determination will not be set aside by this 
Court unless there is no substantial evidence 
in the record to support it. 
604 P.2d at 938 (citations omitted.) The Commission's 
determination in this case was that the appellant was not entitled 
to permanent total disability benefits. The determination was 
based on evidence in the record that there was no causal 
connection between appellant's industrial injury and his permanent 
total disability. The injury occurred on March 25, 1985. The 
appellant himself testified that he had not been employed, nor had 
he worked consistently in any capacity, since September of 1982. 
(R 37, R 69). At the time of the injury, he was applying for 
employment (R 38) and he was 61 years old, with a history of 
industrial injuries and back pain, and was obese (R 3, R 59-63, R 
124, R 166, R 42, R 103, R 109). 
The definition of total disability was set forth in United 
Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800 
(1964). The Court stated: 
This Court has recognized the principle that a. 
workman may be found totally disabled if by 
reason of the disability resulting from his 
injury he cannot perform work of the general 
character he was performing when injured, or 
any other work which a [person] of his 
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to 
do • . • 
15 Utah 2d at 412, 393 P.2d at 801-802 (emphasis added.) The 
Commission has determined that under the facts presented to it, 
appellant's inability to work is not "by reason of the disability 
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resulting from his injury." TL found that appellant's permanent 
and total disability, althou<:r qui*'- i-ili -.-is m-* a < ^su * .• his 
wo r k - L e I a t. e cI i 11 • 1111 >' TI: ie r e - < :• c o r d 
to support the finding. 
Hodges \ . Western Piling & Sheeting Co. , supr ar presented a 
s i m i 1 a r s i t u a t i o n, H odges was a s i x t y - e i g h t y e a r o 1 d rn a n who 
injured his upper right .: n t\ *i course : rir employment. 
A f t e in 1 I in i * - ' * • • a 1 : I: 1 i r i t i c 
condition, H*- :,]<<, .... I^i; f-.r H I * e * compensation benefits 
ai id was fo^ntf onf percer* impaired n * medical panel. 
Tl ie panel f * :.i asymptomatic 
before the i n d u s t r y * ;•:•:.- * •-:-.- the injury. 
W i t h o i 11 11: : , < •- 4 c e i 11 t o t a 3 1 y 
i m p a i . e d . The pane, i, •*.:!. . • twen ty - s ix p e r c e n t of the tt l i r t y -
f i v e p e r c e n t wut - . t--exi:-:t
 : . ^ a i - : e percen was due t .o t he 
ind . ' * "i /I : • eoiisi dered 
h i s c a s e .-. t , v^t-i d e t e r m i n e d tha t : Hodges was no t t o t a l l y 
d i s a t ^d '<• * + * ht- i n d u s t r y a c c i d e n t . The Commission aff irmed 
" < • . ^ , -t , - • ^ - r r lat i oi \. 
appeaJ lodges contended that t:.e administrative law judge 
erred ±u i d m n g to fii id that he was permanently and totally 
disabled and in fai 3 ing to fi nd that hi s arthritic condition was a 
pre-existing impairment. 717 P.2d at 721. The Cour t responded, 
A determination whether an individual is 
permanently and totally disabled is a factual 
question to be resolved by the Commission and 
will not be set aside by this Court unless 
there is no substantial evidence in the record 
t support i t . I n 11: I i s c a s <= - , t h e r e i s 
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substantial evidence in the record to support 
the Commission's determination that petitioner 
was not permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of hig work-related injury and the 
impairment pre-existing the industrial 
accident. 
Id., emphasis added. As in Hodges' case, the evidence here shows 
that appellant's permanent total disability is not a result of his 
work-related injury and the impairment pre-existing the injury. 
The medical evidence submitted to Judge Sumsion established that 
the appellant's permanent physical impairment was attributable to 
the condition of his back and was ten percent, with approximately 
five percent due to the work-related injury (R 167). Impairment 
and disability are distinguishable for workers' compensation 
purposesr impairment being but one of the factors comprising 
disability. Norton v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 
1986). Hodges had a one hundred percent impairment due to 
arthritis. He was also totally disabled. He was not, however, 
permanently and totally disabled for the purposes of the workers' 
compensation statute, because the arthritis which caused his 
disability was not a result of his work-related injury. The 
appellant presently before the Court has a ten percent impairment, 
yet he, like Hodges, is totally disabled. His disability, like 
Hodges', does not make him permanently and totally disabled for 
the purposes of the workers' compensation statute. His disability 
is not a result of his current work-related impairment/ but rather 
a result of his age, lack of education, lack of transferable 
skills, and his pre-existing physical problems (weight, broken 
wrist, injured knees). Judge Sumsion stated, 
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D i s a b i l i t y a nd p e r s o n a l i n j ury are i i ot 
synonymous terms. Personal injury relates to 
the a c c i d e n t . D i s a b i l i t y relates to t h e 
applicant's employability. 
[The applicant's] disability is quite clearly 
attributable to his advanced age and lack of 
transferable skills and only incidentally to 
his physical impairment. Had the incident of 
M a r c h 2 5 , 1 9 8 5 f n e v e r o c c u r r e d , [his] 
disability status would be little changed 
• • • » 
There is substanti al evidence i i :t tl ie record tc: > support the 
administrative ] aw judge"s determination tl iat the appellant would 
1: i a v e lb e e i i < ::i i s a b J e d w h e t her the work-re ] a t e d i i 1 j u r y I i ad occurred or 
not. In Hodges , the arthr itic conditioned which caused total 
disability occurred after Hodges wc i :k i:e3 at ed i i IjI Ii:] > 11 I 1 : 1: Ii s 
case, the conditions which caused the appel 3 ant"s total disabi lity 
occurred before the work-related injury. In neither case was the 
disabi I it y ii iirMjl! ul I In win I; iHlatad in |iiry. Ii : t < :>i .h cases, 
partial benefits were awarded - r. t!" !- -is of the results which in 
fact were caused ; \ • * .- lifetime benefits, however/ were 
n< -*••-• > ..*. . * ^ contemplation of the workers' 
compensation statutes to make employers the gener al insurers and 
benefactors of all emp 1 oyees who ai:e i i Ijured :i i i 11: ie <: ourse of 
employment regardless o f the effect or consequences ot the injury. 
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POINT I I . THE QUESTION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, AND THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURTf 
IS WHETHER THERE IS A CAUSAL CONNECTION 
BETWEEN APPELLANT'S INJURY AND HIS DISABILITY; 
APPELLANT'S EMPLOYEE-STATUS IS NOT AT ISSUE, 
BUT MERELY A FACTOR TO BE WEIGHED AS PART OF 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE DETERMINATION OF 
THE ISSUE. 
As a p p e l l a n t n o t e s , t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law judge engaged in 
some c o n s i d e r a t i o n of "whether or not a d i s t i n c t i o n should be made 
be tween a c l a i m f o r i n j u r i e s and a c l a i m f o r pe rmanen t t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y " i n a c a s e of " a l m o s t f o r t u i t o u s " c i r c u m s t a n c e s in 
which an o l d e r , unemployed worker s u f f e r s an a c c i d e n t du r ing a 
j o b - a p p l i c a t i o n t e s t (R 1 8 1 ) . As t h e Commission noted in i t s 
o r d e r , t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s Motion for Review r e s t e d on t h e c la im t h a t 
t h e r e s h o u l d be no d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of 
" e m p l o y e e " f o r t h e v a r i o u s t y p e s of w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n 
b e n e f i t s . The C o m m i s s i o n , h o w e v e r , s e e m s t o h a v e t a k e n 
a p p e l l a n t ' s p o i n t r e g a r d i n g e m p l o y e e - s t a t u s . I t s t a t e d . 
On August 12 f 1987, p u r s u a n t t o U.C.A. 3 5 - 1 -
8 2 . 5 3 , c o u n s e l f o r t h e a p p l i c a n t f i l e d a 1 
l i n e M o t i o n f o r Rev iew. Tha t Mot ion f o r 
Review s i m p l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of 
e m p l o y e e i s t h e same f o r p e r m a n e n t t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y a s i t i s f o r o t h e r w o r k e r s 
c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s . The Commission t a k e s 
t h i s t o mean t h a t counse l for t h e a p p l i c a n t 
f e e l s t h a t i f temporary b e n e f i t s a r e awarded 
because t h e a p p l i c a n t i s deemed t o have been 
an employee even though the f a c t s t e c h n i c a l l y 
show him t o have been a n o n - e m p l o y e e , then 
permanent t o t a l b e n e f i t s should be awarded on 
t h a t same t h e o r y i t t h e a p p l i c a n t q u a l i f i e s 
for t hose b e n e f i t s . 
(R 1 9 0 , e m p h a s i s a d d e d . ) The C o m m i s s i o n d i d n o t a d d r e s s 
a p p e l l a n t ' s employee s t a t u s f u r t h e r , but went on t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
of t he i s s u e whether t h e a p p e l l a n t q u a l i f i e d for permanent t o t a l 
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benefits ^ n, *' > Mie Commission, turned on whether or 
n o t - 1 ^n
 r r e qu i res a causal connect i o n 
between permanent total disability and the industrial injury. The 
Comma ssi 01 :t stated
 f 
The Commission finds the only issue on review 
is whether the appl icant is en t i t l ed to 
permanent to ta l d i sab i l i ty benefi ts . The 
issue regarding what kind of causal connection 
there must be between the industrial injury 
and the permanent to ta l d i sab i l i ty has not 
been addressed to date by the Commission. 
What causes impairment is a question that is 
easier to answer by reference to a medical 
opin io i i Wha t causes d i sab i 1 i ty on a 
permanent basis is not so easily pinpointed. 
The Commission must a g r e e wi th t he 
Administrative Law Judge that U.C.A. 35-1-67 
implies there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the permanent total 
d i s a b i l i t y . The Commission finds i t is 
log ica l to presume tha t the Legis la ture 
intended permanent total disability benefits 
for those employees whose disabili t ies result 
due to an industrial injury and not due to a 
long l i ? t of other factorst The concept of 
proximate cause serves the purpose of allowing 
those whose disabili t ies are truly the result 
of the i n d u s t r i a l injury to be properly 
compensation fsicl. That concept may also 
e l i m i n a t e some i n d u s t r i a l l y in ju red 
individuals from permanent total disability 
compensation, but will not eliminate those 
i n d i v i d u a l ? foe Qther Kinfls of worKers 
compensation benefits. This result seems both 
l o g i c a l and f a i r LQ the Commission and 
therefore the Commisison Tsicl must affirm the 
Administrat ive Law Judge 's adoption of the 
proximate cause theory as i t applies to U.C.A. 
35-1-67. As result, the Commission must deny 
the applicant's Motion for Review. 
(Id., emphasis added.) Judge Sumsion may have pondered over the 
"appropriateness" of awarding permanent total disat; . ,r\ benefits 
to one wr .- r> l ^ • ; i.onemployee • >-• .. ,;t. :e did nut. decide 
21 
Clearly, appellant's status as an applicant for work, rather than 
an employee, was a fact he considered, and rightly so, as it 
supports the conclusion that appellant's disability was not 
related to or caused by the injury he sustained but existed at the 
time he applied. The judge's ruling was simply that the workers1 
compensation statutes require a causal relationship between injury 
and disability before compensation can be awarded. He found no 
causal relationship in appellant's case. The Commission affirmed 
the judge's ruling on the basis of the causal relationship issue, 
and that is the issue before the Court. 
POINT III. THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY IN 
AWARDING WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS WHICH 
RIGHTLY FLOW FROM AN INDUSTRIAL INJURY AND 
DENYING COMPENSATION FOR RESULTS WHICH DO NOT 
FLOW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY. 
As noted in Point II above, the denial of applicant's 
benefits was not based on the fact that he was not an employee at 
the time of his industrial injury. He was denied benefits 
because the evidence showed his injury had not caused his 
disability. When appellant first applied for a hearing, the 
administrative law judge determined what he considered the 
threshold issue: whether or not appellant was entitled to the 
status of employee. Then, on the facts before himr he determined 
that appellant was entitled to benefits "as a result of his 
The applicant presented no evidence that he would have 
been accepted for employment at this or any other job 
absent the injury. That was his burden. The fact was 
that he had been virtually unemployed for a period of 
years prior to his try out. 
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i n d u s t r i a l injury.™ (R 172), The benef i t s were "medical expenses 
i ncu r r ed as the r e s u l t of t h i s acc ident" , and "temporary t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y r e su l t ing from the a p p l i c a n t ' s accident" (R 173). At 
tha t t. in»e ,- U:: i eservec! t he ijuc-st i on*; whether pe r inane lit part ial or 
permanent t o t a l benef i t s should be awarded/ s t a t i n g : 
The appl icant should also receive compensation 
f o r pe rmanen t p a r t i a l i m p a i r m e n t i f the 
ev idence u l t i m a t e l y shows tha t he sustained 
some permanent p a r t i a l impairment as a r e s u l t 
of h i s i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t . I t may be an 
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r as t o whether 
a p p l i c a n t can a s s e r t a c la im for permanent 
t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y bu t t h e r e a r e t o o many 
u n r e s o l v e d i s s u e s a t t h i s t ime t o a l low 
considerat ion of any claim for permanent t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y . Although there are cases in other j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h a t have accorded worke r s ' 
c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s t o a p r o s p e c t i v e 
employee who was i n j u r e d dur ing a t r y - o u t 
p e r i o d , t h e r e i s no known precedent in any j u r i s d i c t i o n for awarding permanent t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y bene f i t s to one who i s in fact a 
non-employee . Fu r the r d i a g n o s t i c work up 
should be accomplished in t h i s case and should 
a t l e a s t include a CT scan as suggested by Dr. 
Barbosa. This should be a t the expense of the 
defendants . 
(R 1 7 2 , e m p h a s i s a d d e d . ) The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law judge 
subsequent ly !>. uri 1 "tin c-v i .ifiu't u l t i m a t e l y - hr •*« -, that 1 the 
appel lant ] sustained some permanent p a r t i a l impairment as a r e s u l t 
of h i s i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y , " for he awarded permanent p a r t i a l 
impairment benef i t s (R lF r e addi t ional medical evidence 
p r e s e n t e d to him with a p p e l l a n t ' s c la im for permanent t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y , together with the evidence adduced at the hear ing, did 
RQ± u l t i m a t e l y show t h a t a p p e l l a n t s u s t a i n e d permanent t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y as a r e su l t of h is i n d u s t r i a l in ju ry . 
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The same s o r t of d e t e r m i n a t i o n made by J u d g e Sumsion was made 
i n H o d g e s , s u p r a . A w o r k e r s 1 i n j u r y may c a u s e c e r t a i n 
r a m i f i c a t i o n s which r e q u i r e c o m p e n s a t i o n b u t n o t c a u s e p e r m a n e n t 
t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y * Not e v e r y w o r k e r who e x p e r i e n c e s a p e r m a n e n t 
p a r t i a l i m p a i r m e n t q u a l i f i e s f o r p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y 
c o m p e n s a t i o n . More i s r e q u i r e d , i n c l u d i n g a showing of a c a u s e 
and e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n h i s d i s a b i l i t y and t h e i n d u s t r i a l 
e v e n t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s no i n c o n s i s t e n c y of t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s 
o r d e r . 
P O I N T I V . THE P U R P O S E OF W O R K E R S ' 
COMPENSATION IS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF 
EMPLOYABILITY RESULTING FROM WORK-RELATED 
INJURIES
 f NOT TO PROVIDE DISABILITY PAYMENTS 
TO ALL WORKERS WHO ARE NO LONGER EMPLOYABLE 
REGARDLESS OF CAUSE. 
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e c a u s e of u n e m p l o y a b i l i t y i s n o t a 
c r i t e r i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y 
b e n e f i t s a r e a w a r d e d . At page 12 and 13 of h i s b r i e f , he s t a t e s : 
U t a h Code A n n o t a t e d S e c t i o n 3 5 - 1 - 6 7 s i m p l y 
r e a d s , " I n c a s e s o f p e r m a n e n t t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y . " At no p o i n t d o e s t h e s t a t u t e 
m e n t i o n o r d e s c r i b e t h e n e e d f o r t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y t o be t h e d o m i n a n t c a u s e of 
t h e p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y . 
A p p e l l a n t c i t e s M a r s h a l l v . I n d u s . Com'n of S t a t e of U t a h , 681 
P . 2 d 208 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) , a s s u p p o r t . T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n b u t t h a t , 
a s M a r s h a l l s t a t e s , a " c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f f a c t o r s m u s t b e 
c o n s i d e r e d " i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r one i s d i s a b l e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
t h e one e s s e n t i a l s e c t i o n of t h e w o r k e r s 1 c o m p e n s a t i o n s t a t u t e i s 
§ 3 5 - 1 - 4 5 , which r e a d s , 
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Every employee mentioned in section 35-1-43 
who is injured, and the dependents of every 
such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of or in the course QJ ills 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if 
the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, 
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such 
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines, and, in case of death, 
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided 
in this chapter. The responsibility for 
compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines, and 
funeral expenses provided under this chapter 
shall be on the employer and its insurance 
carrier and not on the employee. 
(Emphasis added.) Section 35-1-45 posits the requirement that, 
for compensation to be paid, loss must be "on account of the 
injury" "ai, isirnj mil* ot m in Hi*; cruise ot his empl o^ roent • " 
The requirement applies \ »., s J5-i-6 • :. constellation of 
factors make a worker unemployable with or without the effect of a 
work-re] ated i njury , 1 :ii s unemployabi 1 ity is not .:n account- of the 
injury" and does not "[arise] < .<- f o- : ne course of his 
employment . . . Benefits are then properly denied, as they were 
in Hodges, supra> and as the Commission determined they should be 
in this case. 
Marsha11 v. Indus. Com'n of Sta te of Utah, supra, emphasizes 
the po in t t h a t worke r s ' compensation i s not a general form of 
b e n e f i t to a l l who work and t h a t the s t a t u t e s do not c r e a t e 
general insurers of employers. I t s t a t e s , 
At the o u t s e t , we note tha t the purpose of the 
w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n a c t s i s " to secure 
workmen . . . a g a i n s t becoming o b j e c t s of 
c h a r i t y , by making reasonable compensation 
f o r c a l a m i t i e s i n c i d e n t a l t o t h e 
employment . . . . " Henrie v. Rocky Mountain 
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Packing Corp., 113 Utah 415, 427, 196 P.2d 
487, 493 (1948). This compensation is not in 
the form of damages for injury, as in a tort 
action, but in the form of payments to 
compensate for the loss of employability 
resulting from the injury. See, e.g., 
Northwest Carriers v. Industrial Commission. 
Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (1981); 2 Larson, The Law 
of Workmen's Compensation § 57.11 (1983). 
Thus, the Utah workers' compensation statutes 
key the amount ot the weekly payment not 
merely to the medical nature of the injury, 
but to a percentage of the workers' average 
weekly wages, reflecting the economic impact 
of the injury on the particular individual. 
See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 35-1-66, -67 (Supp. 
1983). With regard to permanent total 
disability claims, this Court has stated: 
[A] workman may be found totally 
disabled if by reason of the 
disability resulting from his injury 
he cannot perform work of the 
general character he was performing 
when injured, or any other work 
which a man of his capabilities may 
be able to do or to learn to do 
United Park City Mines Company v. Prescott, 15 
Utah 2d 410, 412, 393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (1964) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
681 P.2d at 210, 211 (emphasis added.) Where, as here and as in 
Hodges. supra, loss of employability is not "resulting from the 
injury," but exists without reference to the injury, there can be 
no compensation for the loss of employability. In Marshall, the 
Court went on to state: 
Disability is evaluated not in the abstract, 
but in terms of the specific individual who 
has suffered a work-related injury. An injury 
to a hand would not cause the same degree of 
disability in a teacher, for example, as it 
would in an electrician. Thus, in assessing 
the loss of earning capacity, a constellation 
of factors must be considered, only one of 
which is the physical impairment. Other 
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f a c t o r s a r e a g e , e d u c a t i o n , t r a i n i n g and 
m e n t a l c a p a c i t y . 
I t i s t h e u n i q u e c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f t h e s e 
f a c t o r s t h a t t o g e t h e r w i l l d e t e r m i n e t h e 
i m p a c t of t h e i m p a i r m e n t on t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y . 
I d , . c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d , e m p h a s i s a d d e d . When an i m p a i r m e n t due t o 
a w o r k - r e l a t e d i n j u r y haii no .inipcirl <wi t h e i n d i v i d u a l \(:. ea i n i n g 
c a p a c i t y , t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s u n e m p l o y a b i l i t y i s s i m p l y n o t 
c o m p e n s a b l e u n d e r t h e w o r k e r s 1 c o m p e n s a t i o n s t a t u t e . The 
a c c i d e n t ,- t I: i e :i i i j u i: ;y
 f in i i s 1 : I: :i a v c ? s o m e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e 
unemployability. All medical expenses and other forms of benefits 
described in the statute are tied to § 35-1-43 a warded 
only when the evidence shows that the industrial event and injury 
caused thereby, in turn, are a cause of the unemployability. In 
this case tl: le Commission foi ind that t ho uni-mployabi J i ty predated, 
and was independent of, the industr ial event. Therefore/ the 
unemployability was not the result of the industrial event as is 
requi red by § 3 b-1 - 4 r I'". \". A . 
POINT V. PERMANENT INCAPACITY INDEPENDENTLY 
PRODUCED BY P R E - E X I S T I N G I N F I R M I T Y , 
DEGENERATIVE CONDITION, AND AGE, DOES NOT 
BECOME COMPENSABLE BECAUSE OF A LAST ACCIDENT 
WHICH MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE PRE-EXISTING 
IMPAIRMENT. 
A s t l c • • ::.! : i i : i 1 : i n M a r s h a l l , s u p r a , n o t e d , p h y s i c a l i m p a i r m e n t 
i s b u t one of t h e f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p e r m a n e n t 
t o t a J <• : •- n i ] i t y . 11 , t h i s c a s e , t h e e v i d e i i c e s u s t a i n s t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t was p e r m a n e n t l y t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d and 
u n e m p l o y a b l e p r i o r t o and a p a r t f rom h i s w o r k - r e l a t e d i n j u r y 
d e s p i t e any a g g r a v a t i o n of h i s p r e - e x i s t i n g i m p a i r m e n t . 
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Appellant's reliance on § 35-1-69(1) is misplaced. The 
purpose of § 35-1-69(1) is to apportion liability for permanent 
incapacity between employers and the Second Injury Fund. The 
determination as to whether compensation for permanent total 
disability should be awarded is a separate determination which 
must precede application of § 35-1-69(1). In McPhie v. United 
States Steel Corporation, 551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976), the Court 
discussed § 35-1-69 as follows: 
One of the purposes of the statute above 
referred to was to encourage employers to hire 
handicapped workers by requiring the special 
fund to assume responsibility should the 
employee receive an industrial injury from 
which he might become totally disabled from 
further employment. The second purpose was to 
establish a broader base of responsibility for 
preexisting conditions. 
551 P.2d at 505 (emphasis added.) Whenf as in this case, the 
industrial event is not that from which the employee became 
totally disabled from further employment, permanent total 
disability benefits are not awarded. Therefore, the 
apportionment of permanent total benefits between employer and the 
Second Injury Fund does not become an issue and § 35-1-69 is 
inapplicable. 
The purpose of § 35-1-69(1), stated in McPhie, would be 
thwarted if appellant were to be awarded permanent total benefits. 
Such an award would discourage employers from allowing older, 
obese job applicants with prior physical disorders the opportunity 
of a tryout. If a prospective employer runs the risk of being 
liable for permanent total benefits if a mishap occurs during the 
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tryout process, prospective employers will not grant such 
oppo i: t u n i t i e s • : i J i c a p pe ci • 
As appellar! lotes, the administrative law judge accepted 
appellant's dor* -
 w tlml tin a< cldf-iil did dijqiavafe a jr.re-
existing impairment , cut he also found that permanent incapacity 
existed without the aggravation, and would have existed had the 
accident i 1 evei: occui:red , 11 i I ii s 11:e • a11se The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, Professor Arthur Larson discusses degeneration and 
infirmities due to age arid apportionment of benefits foi pre-
e x i s 11 n g c o n d i t i o n s. H i s d iscussion is p e r t i n e n t , at :., in p a r t , 
it follows: 
For example, ii 1 Eagle Indemnity Company v. 
Hadley. [70 Ariz. 179, 218 P.2d 488 (1950)] 
the claimant was a man of sixty-six years of 
age, whose disability after a fall consisted 
of (1) limitation of spinal motion, (2) 
limitation of shoulder motion, (3) impaired 
eyesight, (4) impaired hearing, (5) arthritis 
in both hands, (6) frequent urination at 
night, (7) cramps and poor circulation in feet 
and legs, (8) low back pains, (9) dizzy 
spells, (10) gall bladder attacks, and (11) 
excessive night sweats, Iii this appalling 
catalog of infirmity, only items (1) and (2) 
were directly produced by the fall; the rest 
were due to "normal physiological degenerating 
processes not referable to the injury," 
although the degeneration might have been 
accelerated somewhat by the injury. The 
undisputed fact remains that claimant, up to 
the fall, had been working steadily and, for 
all that appears, would have continued to do 
so indefinitely but for the accident. In 
short, there was no apportionable "disability" 
prior to the accident. The principle that 
degeneration and infirmities due to age which 
have not previously produced disability are 
not a proper basis for reduction of 
compensation is amply supported by authorities 
from other jurisdictions. 
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Of c o u r s e , t h e mat ter i s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t i f 
the d e g e n e r a t i v e c o n d i t i o n i s i t s e l f the c a u s e 
o f t h e d i s a b i l i t y f o r which compensat ion i s 
c l a i m e d , q u i t e a p a r t from t h e e f f e c t of the 
i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t . Thus , i t may be found on 
the f a c t s of a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e t h a t a f t e r t h e 
p e r i o d of temporary d i s a b i l i t y caused by t h e 
a c c i d e n t was c o m p l e t e d , any s u b s e q u e n t l o n g -
r a n g e d i s a b i l i t y s t emmed e n t i r e l y from a 
p r e e x i s t i n g i n f i r m i t y . 
The e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n a t s t a k e here i s 
b e t w e e n a p r e e x i s t i n g d i s a b i l i t y t h a t 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y p r o d u c e s a l l or p a r t o f t h e 
f i n a l d i s a b i l i t y , and a p r e - e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n 
t h a t i n some way c o m b i n e s w i t h or i s a c t e d 
upon by the i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y . 
2 L a r s o n , The Law o f Workmen's C o m p e n s a t i o n , § 5 9 . 2 2 ( a ) and 
5 9 . 2 2 ( b ) a t 1 0 - 3 7 6 t h r o u g h 10-395 (emphasis added . ) Here , t h e 
p r e - e x i s t i n g d i s a b i l i t y ( e a c h a n d e v e r y f a c t o r o f i t ) 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y p r o d u c e d t h e f i n a l d i s a b i l i t y . T h e r e f o r e , 
a p p e l l a n t s use of § 3 5 - 1 - 6 9 t o f i n d c o m p e n s a b i l i t y i s m i s p l a c e d . 
POINT V I . AN INJURY WHICH IS COMPENSABLE BY 
MEANS OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY AND 
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS IS NOT 
NECESSARILY ONE FOR WHICH PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY BENEFITS MUST BE AWARDED; THE 
EVIDENCE MUST BE WEIGHED BY THE TRIER OF FACTS 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT TOTAL 
DISABILITY RESULTED FROM THE INJURY. 
The a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t "the i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y of March 2 5 , 
1 9 8 5 , took the l a s t of h i s c a p a b i l i t i e s away and f i n a l l y l e f t him 
p e r m a n e n t l y a n d t o t a l l y i n c a p a b l e o f e a r n i n g a w a g e . " 
( A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f , p . 1 8 . ) But t h e f a c t s r e v e a l t h a t t h e 
a p p e l l a n t had not earned a wage s i n c e 1982 (R 1 5 , R 3 7 , R 6 9 ) . He 
was a t t e m p t i n g t o a c q u i r e employment on March 2 5 , 1985 , but d id 
n o t manage t o comple te the r e q u i r e d t e s t i n g w i t h o u t f a l l i n g and 
i n j u i: I n g h i in s e 1 f . T h e a d in I i :i i s t r a t i v e ] a w j u d (3 e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t h e 
was entitled to benefits for the medical expenses, the temporary 
total disability compensation for ti ie period before his physical 
condition stabilized, permanent partial disability benefits for 
the loss of bodily function directly attributable to the 
industrial event, a 1 1 d be 1 1 efits tr0m the Second Injury for the 
preexisting loss of bodily function. But, the judge also found 
appellant would be permanently totally disabled whether or not he 
had been injured in his attempt to rejoin the work force after a 
long absence. 
P r o £ e s s 01: L a r s 0 n, i n 1: 1 i s t 1: e a t i s e , s t a t e s 1 
"Total disability" in compensation law is not 
to be interpreted literally as utter and 
abject helplessness. Evidence that claimant 
has been able to earn occasional wages or 
perform certain kinds of gainful work does not 
necessarily rule out a finding of fatal 
disability . , . 
Under the odd-lot doctrine* which is accepted 
in virtually every jurisdiction, total 
disability may be found in the case of workers 
who, while not altogether incapacitated for 
work, are so handicapped that they will not be 
employed regularly in any well-known branch of 
the labor market. The essence of the test is 
the probable dependability with which claimant 
can sell his services in a competitive labor 
market, undistorted by such factors as 
business booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or 
the superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise 
above his crippling handicaps. 
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 57.51(a) at 10-
164.65 through 10-164.84(18). At the time appellant applied for 
work v. . Howard Trucking of Utah, he may not have been utterly 
and abjectly helpless; he may have been able to perform certain 
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kinds of protected work/ although the evidence doesn't support 
the conclusion that he could. The substantial evidence in the 
record shows that he was, at the time he applied, in a state of 
total disability. 
The appellant has a 10% permanent physical impairment, 5% of 
which his treating physician attributes to the injury at Howard 
Trucking. But it is not his impairment which renders him 
unemployable. It is the whole constellation of factors together— 
age, education, impairment, obesity, training, mental capacity— 
which create his unemployability. The Court's definition of total 
disability, quoted supra, makes one eligible for permanent total 
benefits "if by reason of the disability resulting from his injury 
he cannot perform work of the general character he was performing 
when injured" (Brundaqe v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792 
(Utah 1980)) or other work a person of his capabilities may be 
able to do or to learn to do. The factors which made the 
appellant incapable of being employed are independent of the 
results of his injury and, in fact, existed prior to the injury. 
The liberal extension to him of benefits as a result of the 
immediate consequences of his attempt to perform work cannot be 
superimposed upon the facts which show his total disability is 
unrelated to the occurrence at Howard Trucking. 
CONCLUSION 
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the 
Commission's finding that appellant's disability and 
unemployability did not result because of an industrial injury, 
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b i 11 b e c a u s e o £ c i " ] o n g ] i s t o f c > t h e i • f a c t o r s fl (R .1 9 0 ) , The 
conclusion that § 35-1-67 r U t a h C o d e A n n . , r e q u i r e s a c a u s a l 
c c • n n e c t i c i i b e t we e i i :i n j u i: y a nd pe rma ne nt t o t a 1 d i s a b i 1 11y i s n o t 
contrary to law, Tllis finding and this conclusion are the basis 
of the Commission's determination of applicant's claim. The 
applicant's appeal is really asking this Court to reweigh the 
evidence. Under the standard for revi~w of such case^, the Court 
will . T ai I re >* -- ;• ' rr ere is no 
substantial evidence record - support : i,e Commission's 
order There is substantial evidence -n support the commission's 
d e n i a l o f (•*• t niarieiit I ul ul ili j a b i 1 L t > 1 «.-: * • •• • c i s e . 
Respondent respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
Commission's order denying applicant's motion for review aiid his 
claim for workers' compensation benefits from Howard Trucking, 
Inc. 
DATED t .1 lis ~7 day of March, ] 988. 
k ZJL 
James R. Bjack 
'±u 
Wendy/M(/seley 
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Vocational rehabilitation — Procedure 
and payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662/3% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a depen-
dent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, 
up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. However, 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312 
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings 
have been had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently 
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the 
state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of 
the commission to order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of 
the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed 
$1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabili-
tation and training of the employee shall generally follow the practice appli-
cable under § 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having com-
bined injuries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing 
that the employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabil-
itation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there be 
paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with 
the time that the payments, as in this section provided, to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the 
employee. No employee shall be entitled to any such benefits i r he fails or 
refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this 
section. 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to bene-
fits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those 
injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than $120 per week when 
paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with compensation 
payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational 
rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the em-
ployee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is 
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qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the 
employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee 
has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, 
or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total 
and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of 
this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required 
in those instances. In all other cases where there has been rehabilitation 
effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be 
based upon partial permanent disability 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; 
C. 1943, 42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 
52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 
1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 
71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 
1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 5; 1971, ch. 
76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. 13, § 1; 
1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1^77, ch. 150, § 1; 1977 
ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 6; 1979, ch. 138, 
§ 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, ch. 356, § 1; 
1985, ch. 160, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amendment 
substituted "85% of the state average weekly 
wage" for "662/a% of the state average weekly 
wage" four times in the first paragraph and 
once in the last paragraph, increased the mini-
mum benefit per week from $35 to $45 in the 
first paragraph, inserted "not to exceed the av-
erage weekly wage of the employee at the time 
of the injury" twice in the first paragraph, in-
creased the benefit per week from $50 to $60 at 
the end of the third paragraph (deleted by the 
1977 amendment) and near the end of the 
fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment), and substituted "July 1, 1975" for "July 
1, 1974" in the fourth paragraph (deleted by 
the 1977 amendment) 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 substi-
tuted "spouse" for "wife" in the first paragraph 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
chapter 151, combined the fir^t .wo paragraphs 
into one paragraph, inserted the second para-
graph, and deleted the former third and fourth 
paragraphs which read "Commencing July 1, 
1971, all persons who are permanently and 
totally disabled and on that date or prior 
thereto were receiving compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) shall be paid compensation benefits 
at the rate of $60 per week 
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who 
were permanently and totally disabled on or 
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving com-
pensation benefits and continue to receive such 
benefits shall be paid compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) at a rate sufficient to bring their 
weekly benefit to $60 when combined with em-
ployer or insurance carrier compensation pay-
ments " 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 150, in the 
two paragraphs deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment by chapter 156 (quoted above) substi-
tuted "1977" for "1971" and "1975" and substi-
tuted "$75" for "$60 " 
The 1979 amendment increased the mini-
mum benefit in the second paragraph from $75 
to $85 
The 1981 amendment substituted "second in-
jury fund" for "special fund" throughout the 
section, and increased the amount in the sec-
ond paragraph from $85 to $100 
The 1983 amendment substituted "under 
this section" at the end of the first paragraph 
for "as set forth herein", increased the mini-
mum amount in the first sentence of the second 
paragraph from $100 to $110, and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style 
The 1985 amendment substituted "$120" *or 
"$110" in the first sentence of the second para-
graph 
Effective Date. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
ch 160 provided "This act takes effect upon 
approval by the governor, or the day following 
the constitutional time limit of Article VII, 
Sec 8 without the governor's signature, or in 
the case of a veto, the date of \eto override " 
Approved March 18, 1985 
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ANALYSIS 
Prior accidents contributing to disability 
Statute of limitations 
Total disability 
—Question of fact 
Cited 
Prior accidents contributing to disability. 
Employee who was permanently and totally 
disabled due to a combination of prior and 
present accidents was entitled to lifetime bene-
fits payable from the special fund provided for 
in 35-1-68 McPhie v Industrial Comm (Utah 
1977) 567 P 2d 153 
Statute of limitations. 
This section governs permanent total dis-
ability claims and contains no statute of limi-
tations for such claims, therefore, where em-
ployee suffered an injury in October of 1961 
and notice of injury and claim was properly 
given and filed in accordance with require-
ments of 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, and employee 
was found to have suffered permanent partial 
disability and received 40 weeks of compensa-
tion through December of 1964 and payment of 
medical bill through 1966, employee's claim 
filed m December of 1982 for permanent total 
disability resulting from slow det o ra t ion of 
a condii "a caused by 1961 injury was timely 
filed under this section and, under 35-1-78, in-
dustrial commission had continuing jurisdic-
tion to award permanent total disability com-
pensation Mecham v Industrial Comm of 
Utah (Utah 1984) 692 P 2d 783 
Total disability. 
Where an employee demonstrates that he 
can no longer perform his normal duties as a 
result of a work-related accident, and that he 
cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts 
the employer to prove that suitable, stea 
work is available, considering the age, ment 
capacity, and education of the employee, in c 
der to preclude a determination of total ai 
permanent disability under the odd-lot dc 
trine Marshall v Industrial Comm of Ut< 
(Utah 1984) 681 P 2d 208 
For discussion of the odd-lot doctrine, s 
Hardman v Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt & Se 
ond Injury Fund, 725 P 2d 1323 (Utah 198( 
Employee, who was almost 60, with a hmit< 
education and an even more limited woi 
background, presented a prima facie case 
tentative permanent total disability, where 1 
suffered from headaches and dizziness aftt 
sustaining a skull fracture, and despite his er 
plover's contentions that it offered various jol 
to employee, the record was devoid of any coi 
crete evidence that he was offered work of tr 
general nature that he had been ptrformmj 
Hardman v Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt & Se 
ond Injury Fund, 725 P 2d 1323 (Utah 1986 
—Question of fact. 
The question of whether an employee wa 
totally and permanently disabled was one < 
fact to be decided by the commission, upon a 
of the evidence in the case Kerans v Indus 
trial Comm'n, 713 P 2d 49 (Utah 1985) 
Cited in Booms v Rapp Constr Co . 
P2d 1363 (Utah 1986) 
72 
35-1-68, Second Injury Fund — Injury causing death — 
Burial expenses — Payments to dependents. 
(1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the purpose of making pay 
ments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 This fund shall succeed to al 
monies heretofore held in that fund designated as the "Special Fund" or the 
"Combined Injury Fund" and whenever reference is made elsewhere in this 
code to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" that reference shall 
be deemed to be to the Second Injury Fund The state treasurer shall be the 
custodian of the Second Injury Fund and the commission shall direct its distri-
bution Reasonable administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds 
of that fund. The attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to 
represent the Second Injary Fund m all proceedings brought to enforce claims 
against it 
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the date of the 
accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of 
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ANALYSIS 
Business of employer. 
Loaned employee. 
Volunteer worker. 
Business of employer. 
Owner of ten parcels of real property on 
which were 19 rental units which owner 
actively managed was in the rental business, 
and employee he hired to paint and repair 
units for forty hours a month was not within 
the exclusion of subd. (2) of this section. 
Sorenson v. Industrial Comm. (Utah 1979) 598 
P 2d 362. 
Loaned employee. 
Where employee of trucking company was 
assigned by the company to haul a load of wood 
paneling for the defendant and directed by the 
company to assist defendant's employees in 
loading the truck, for purposes of this act the 
truck driver became defendant's employee dur-
ing the loading process, and when he was in-
35-1-44. Definition of terms 
A.L.R. — Workers' compensation law as pre-
cluding employee's suit against employer for 
oS-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and the de-
pendents of every such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or in 
the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident 
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 1917, substituted "as provided in this chapter" in the 
§ 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. first sentence for "as is herein provided"; added 
1943, 42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1. the second sentence; and made minor changes 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1984 amendment in phraseology, punctuation and style. 
ANALYSIS 
Accident. 
Aggravation or acceleration of injury or disease. 
Arising out of or in course of employment. 
Burden of proof. 
Causal connection. 
^oing to and from work. 
"Special hazards" exception. 
jured in the course of it, his remedy against 
defendant was limited to the collection of work-
men's compensation benefits. Bambrough v. 
Bethers (Utah 1976) 552 P 2d 1286. 
Volunteer worker. 
Helper in a school shop class pursuant to the 
Retired Senior Volunteer Program was a vol-
unteer worker, and not an employee of the 
school, and was therefore not entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits, where there 
was no express or implied contract of hire be-
tween the helper and the school, the helper re-
ceived no compensation from the school, and 
the school had no control over his hours or any 
other aspect of his volunteer work. Board of 
Education of Alpine School Dist. v. Olsen 
(Utah 1984) 684 P 2d 49. 
third person's criminal attack, 49 A.L.R.4th 
926. 
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Horseplay. 
Hospital charges. 
Idiopathic fall doctrine. 
Medical services. 
Participating on team sponsored by employer. 
Personal comfort rule. 
Predisposition to injury. 
Recovery of funds. 
—Mistake of fact. 
Self-inflicted injuries. 
Special errand on behalf of employer. 
Volunteer workers. 
Cited. 
Accident. 
Death of employee who had a preexisting 
heart weakness was the result of an "accident" 
arising out of and in the course of employment 
where death by heart attack occurred while 
working on the job, and because of a mechani-
cal defect in the truck the employee was oper-
ating he was required to repeatedly hoist him-
self up into the cab, requiring a greater exer-
tion than would have been required had the 
truck been working properly. Nuzum v. 
Roosendahl Constr. & Mining Corp. (Utah 
1977) 565 P 2d 1144. 
An internal failure brought about by exer-
tion in the course of employment may be an 
accident without the requirement that the in-
• ury result from some incident which happened 
suddenly and is identifiable at a definite time 
and place; however, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the employ-
ment. Schmidt v. Industrial Comm. of Utah 
(Utah 1980) 617 P 2d 693. 
Accident is an unanticipated, unintended oc-
currence different from what would normally 
be expected to occur in the usual course of 
events; thus, if an employee incurs unexpected 
injuries, including internal failures caused by 
the duties of his employment he is eligible for 
compensation under this section. Painter Mo-
tor Co. v. Ostler (Utah 1980) 617 P 2d 975. 
Evidence that employee experienced a 
"catch" in his back while shoveling rock in the 
course of his employment was sufficient, in 
light of his history of work-related back inju-
ries and medical condition, to establish that 
such shoveling incident could have added to or 
aggravated a job-induced preexisting back cor^ 
dition and that the injury and disability caused 
by the incident resulted from an accident. Kai-
ser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi (Utah 1981) 631 P 
2d 888. 
Claimant failed to prove that back injury re-
ceived while engaged in his employment was 
the result of an accident where there was no 
evidence that showed anything unusual about 
his activities on the day of the injury or any 
unusual exertion or strain or contact with ob-
jects or a fall. Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sat 
(Utah 1982) 642 P 2d 722. 
Where claimant fell and injured her knee i 
work, it was held that she did not sustain £ 
"accidental injury" within the meaning of tl 
statute, since that type of accident could ha1* 
occurred away from work. Billings Comput 
Corp. v. Tarango (Utah 1983) 674 P 2d 10 
Claimant suffered a compensable industri 
accident, where his jumps into an eight-fo 
hole from a four-foot platform at thirty-minu 
intervals while cleaning steel forms and ten 
ing a sump pump at a construction site consl 
tuted a considerably greater exertion than th 
encountered in nonempWment life, notwit 
standing his prior medical history of spondyl 
listhesis. Miera v Industrial Comm'n, 728 P , 
1023 (Utah 1986;. 
Claimant's injury, which occurred as ] 
began to put on "heavy and unwieldy cove 
alls" required for the outdoor constructs 
work in which he was engaged, was "by ac< 
dent," where none of the evidence indicat 
that he had experienced repeated pain or i 
jury as with an occupational disease or oth 
foreseeable injury. Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 7' 
P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986). 
An accident is an unexpected or unintend 
occurrence that may be either the cause or t 
result of an injury. Allen v. Industrial Comm 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
Although proof of an unusual event may 
helpful in determining causation, it is not i 
quired as an element of "by accident" in tl 
section. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P. 
15 (Utah 1986). 
Claimant, a bus driver who suddenly felt 
popping in his back, accompanied by sha 
pain, when he negotiated a turn while drivi 
an older type bus which he did not usual 
drive, was injured "by accident." Utah Tran 
Auth. v. Booth, 728 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1986 
Claimant, a nurse, was properly award 
benefits for aggravation of a preexisting i 
jury, where her subsequent back injury, si 
tained while she was lifting a 190-pound j 
tient, was work-related and unexpected a 
therefore constituted a compensable accidei 
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Richfield Care Center v Torgerson, No 20412 
(Utah Sup Ct filed Feb 12, 1987) 
Aggravation or acceleration of injury or 
disease. 
Compensation was denied a truck driver who 
underwent surgery following two 1975 inci-
dents of back discomfort on the job, which ag-
gravated driver's scoliosis of the spine and 
spondylolysis, both of which conditions devel-
oped after a trucking accident suffered in 1972, 
since the type of work he was engaged in at the 
time of the 1975 incidents was not unusual or 
unexpected and the aggravation of his physical 
condition gradually developed without the in-
tervention of any external occurrence or 
trauma Farmers Grain Cooperative v Mason 
(Utah 1980) 606 P 2d 237 
Arising out of or in course of employment. 
Where the evidence affirmatively shows that 
the assigned duties of a traveling salesman in-
clude keeping his car in a safe and efficient 
running condition, there is a reasonable basis 
to support the commission's findings that in-
jury to him while he was working on his car 
arose within the scope of his employment 
Hafer's, Inc v Industrial Comm of Utah 
(Utah 1974) 526 P 2d 1188 
Claimant was not entitled to compensation 
as a result of an automobile accident at the end 
of a claimed busmesz^nd pleasure trip, where 
the trip was primarily to visit a personal friend 
and former employer of the claimant and the 
business end of the trip could have been accom-
plished in the claimant's office Martinson v 
W-M Insurance Agency, Inc (Utah 1980) 606 P 
2d 256 
A truck driver whose practice was to take 
home a tractor to clean and service it with the 
knowledge of his employers was acting in the 
course of his employment when he was killed 
in an accident on his way home from his place 
of employment Kinne v Industrial Comm 
(Utah 1980) 609 P 2d 926 
Conduct of employee in running to investi-
gate and to offer help when it appeared that a 
fellow employee might be in danger or distress 
was a natural and reasonably expectable reac-
tion so that his subsequent death from heart 
attack was an accident arising out of his em-
ployment, fact that deceased had a preexisting 
heart condition did not preclude finding that 
his death resulted from an accident in the 
coux^e of employment United States Steel 
Corp v Draper (Utah 1980) 613 P 2d 508 
Where president of newspaper invited the 
newspaper's managing editor and his wife to 
attend the governors ball with her and her 
husband and to come to her home for cocktails 
before the dinner and for conversation after-
wards, and where at no time during the eve-
ning did discussions concerning the newspaper 
business occur between the managing editor 
and the newspaper's president, the Industrial 
Commission's finding that the managing edi-
tor's death in an automobile accident while re-
turning home after attending the ball arose out 
of his employment was upheld on appeal to the 
supreme court where there was substantial ev-
idence before the commission that the manag-
ing editor's paramount or predominant motiva-
tion and purpose in making the trip was to 
serve the interests of the newspaper, fact that 
the newspaper's president intended the affair 
to be purely social did not require a different 
result where the president's intentions had not 
been communicated to the managing editor 
Ogden Standard Examiner v Industrial 
Comm of Utah (Utah 1983) 663 P 2d 88 
Bank employee was not within course of his 
employment when he was killed in an airplane 
crash while on an elk hunt with his brother-in-
law where hunting trip was clearly for social, 
and not business, purposes Carnesecca v 
Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove (Utah 1984) 
688 P 2d 476 
Where there was substantial evidence that 
an injury suffered by an employee at work was 
not the cause of his traffic accident later that 
day on his way home from work, the worker's 
ensuing death from injuries relating to the 
traffic accident did net arise out of or in the 
course of his employment Higgms v indus-
trial Comm'n (Utah 1985) 700 P 2d 704 
Burden of proof. 
The burden of proof in workmen's compensa-
tion cases is proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence Lipman v Industrial Comm (Utah 
1979) 592 P 2d 616 
Causal connection. 
Evidence that an employee was lifting a very 
heavy beam and felt a sharp pam in his side, 
followed by a medical examination showing 
that he had a perforated ulcer, was sufficient to 
support a finding that there was a causal con-
nection between the lifting and the perfora-
tion, and that an "accident" occurred, despite 
the examining doctor's statement that he knew 
of no medical data which cited lifting as a 
cause of ulcer perforation Champion Home 
Bldrs v Industrial Comm'n (Utah 1985) 703 P 
2d 306 
A two-part te t is applied in determining 
causation (1) Whare the claimant suffers from 
a preexisting condition which contributes to 
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exer-
tion is required to prove legal causation, where 
there is no preexisting condition, a usual or 
ordinary exertion is sufficient (2) Under the 
medical cause test, the claimant must show by 
evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, 
strain, or exertion required by his or her occu-
pation led to the resulting injury or disability, 
and in the event the claimant cannot show a 
medical causal connection, compensation 
42 
35-1-45 LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
should be denied Allen v Industrial Comm'n, 
729 P 2d 15 (Utah 1986) 
Before legal causation could be established 
in the case of a miner who was suffering from 
heart disease prior to his fatal heart attack in a 
coal mine, the commission was required to find 
that his employment activities involved exer-
tion or stress in excess of the normally ex-
pected level of nonemployment activity for 
men and women in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century Price River Coal Co v Indus-
trial Comm'n, No 20473 (Utah Sup Ct filed 
Dec 31, 1986) 
Going to and from work. 
— "Special hazards" exception. 
For the "special hazards" exception to the 
going-to-and-from-work rule to apply, the spe-
cial hazard must be the proximate cause of the 
injury, and remote causes of injury, such as the 
vehicle door suddenly coming open, are not suf-
ficient to invoke the exception Soldier Creek 
Coal Co v Bailey (Utah 1985) 709 P 2d 1165 
Horseplay. 
Factors to be considered in determining 
whether an act of horseplay constitutes such a 
deviation from employ nent that it can be said 
that an injury resulting trom the horseplay did 
not arise in the course of employment, and 
therefore is not compensable, are the extent 
and seriousness of the deviation, the complete-
ness of the deviation, the extent to which 
horseplay has become a part of the employ-
ment, and the extent to which the nature of the 
employment may be expected to include some 
such horseplay Prows v Industrial Comm of 
Utah (Utah 1980) 610 P 2d 1362, J & W Jani-
torial Co v Industrial Comm of Utah (Utah 
1983) 661 P 2d 949 
Injury to employee as the result of horseplay 
did not arise out of or from course of employ-
ment, and was therefore not compensable un-
der workers' compensation, where the 
horseplay occurred on the work premises after 
working hours and the employees engaged in 
the horseplay had no work-related reason for 
remaining on the premises, the horseplay was 
not co-mingled with the performance of any 
work duty, there was no evidence that the 
horseplay engaged in on the night of the acci-
dent ^ad become a customary practice, and the 
work of the employees was not the type that 
promoted horseplay J & W Janitorial Co v 
Industrial Comm of Utah (Utah 1983) 661 P 
2d 949 
Hospital charges. 
The only power given the Industrial Com-
mission by the workers' compensation statutes 
over hospital charges for services rendered to 
injured employees is the right to refuse to pay 
that part of them which is excessive in amount 
or for care which was not reasonably neces-
sary, Industrial Commission does not have th< 
power and authority to set maximum rate 
which hospitals may charge for services ren 
dered injured employees, and hospitals are no 
prohibited from holding an injured employei 
liable for any amounts not paid by the commis 
sion Intermountam Health Care, Inc v Indus 
trial Comm of Utah (Utah 1982) 657 P 2< 
1289 
Idiopathic fall doctrine. 
Where plant employee fell into tank of water 
and drowned on employer's premises after suf-
fering a heart attack, and while away from his 
work station on break, his death was consid-
ered to be in the course of employment pursu-
ant to the personal comfort rule, and also 
work-related under the idiopathic fall doctrine, 
and thus covered under the workers' compen-
sation statute Kennecott Corp, Kennecott 
Minerals Co Div v Industrial Comm of Utah 
(Utah 1983) 675 P 2d 1187 
Medical services. 
Import of this section is that medicals are 
something additional to and separate frum the 
compensation Kennecott Copper Corp v in-
dustrial Comm (Utah 1979) 597 P 2d O.J 
Participating on team sponsored by em-
ployer. 
A restaurant employee was not in the course 
of his employment when he was traveling with 
fellow employees to play in a softball game 
against employees of another restaurant 
owned by the same corporation and was in-
jured m a collision with another automobile 
Black v McDonald's of Layton, No 860296 
(Utah Sup Ct filed Feb 6, 1987) 
Personal comfort rule. 
Where plant employee fell into tank of water 
and drowned on employer's premises after suf-
fering a heart attack, and while away from his 
work station on lunch break, his death was 
considered to be in the course of employment 
pursuant to the per°onal comfort rule, and also 
work-related undeT ^he idiopathic fall doctrine, 
and thus covered • nder the workers' compen-
sation statute Kennecott Corp, Kennecott 
Minerals Co Div v Industrial Comm of Utah 
(Utah 1983) 675 P 2d 1187 
Predisposition to injury. 
Although delivery truck driver's prior cata-
ract operation rendered him predisposed to ret-
inal detachment, truck driver was entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits for a detached 
retina he suffered from jarring caused by an 
attempt to open jammed door on truck while he 
was making his deliveries Giles v Industrial 
Comm of Utah (Utah 1984) 692 P 2d 743 
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Recovery of funds. ceived while coming and going to work where 
employee embarked on her training program 
Mistake of fact.
 w l^.]1 knowledge and permission, and at direc-
Because worker's compensation statutes pro-
 t l o n > o f h e r employer, she would have been re-
vide the exclusive remedy for work-related in-
 imbursed had she submitted her voucher, her juries, in the absence of a statutory provision employer would have benefited from her tram-
for the recovery of funds paid to an employee
 i n g p r 0gram had she been able to complete it, 
because of a mistake of fact, it does not lie training activity was directly related to her job 
within the prerogative of the court to fashion function, and her travel to training program 
any common-law exception to the statutes
 c o u }j b e reasonably termed extraordinary 
Kerans v Industrial Comm'n, 713 P 2d 49
 r a ther than normally incident to her employ-
(Utah 1985)
 m e n t State Tax Comm v Industrial Comm of 
c . - <- . , . . . Utah (Utah 1984) 685 P 2d 1051 
Self-inflicted injuries. 
When employee slammed his fist against a Volunteer workers. 
locked, stationary metal door, it was foresee- Volunteer workers are not entitled to 
able and expected that injury would result to workers' compensation benefits for injuries suf-
his hand the injury was therefore not an acci- fered during the course and within the scope of 
dent, and not compensable (reversing the In- their volunteer labor unless they are specifi-
dustnal Commission's award based on its find- cally made eligible for such benefits by statute 
ing that the injury was not self-inflicted) Board of Education of Alpine School Dist v 
McKay Dee Hosp v Industrial Comm (Utah Olsen (Utah 1984) 684 P 2d 49 
1979) 598 P 2d 375 
Cited in Specialty Cabinet Co v Montoya, 
Special errand on behalf of employer. No 19895 (Utah Sup Ct filed Nov 28, 1986) 
Injuries received by employee while travel- Law Reviews. — Schmidt v Industrial 
ing to job-related training program away from Commission and Injury Compensability under 
her usual place of employment were compensa- Utah Worker's Compensation Law A Just Re-
ble as being within "special errand" exception suit oi Just Another "Living Corpse"7, 1981 
to rule denying compensation for injuries re- Utah L Rev 393 
35-1-46, Employers to secure workers ' compensation ben-
efits for employees — Methods — Failure — No-
tice — Injunction — Violation, 
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, and school districts, shall 
secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees 
(a) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensa-
tion with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments 
shall commence withm 90 days after any final award by the commission, 
(b) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensa-
tion with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to trans-
act the business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, which 
payments shall commence withm 90 days after any final award by the 
commission, 
(c) By furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof of fi-
nancial ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, m the manner, 
and when due as provided for in this title, which payment shall com-
mence withm 90 days after any final award by the commission In these 
cases the commission may in its discretion require the deposit of accept-
able security, indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of compensation 
liabilities as they are incurred, and may at any time change or modify its 
findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment this action is neces-
sary or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with all the 
provisions of law relating to the payment of compensation and the fur-
nishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and burial 
expenses to injured employees and to the dependents of killed employees 
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412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 
(1973). In Barnes, the Court explained 
that this inference is deeply rooted in com-
mon law and approved the following in-
struction: 
[Possession of recently stolen property, 
if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinari-
ly a circumstance from which you may 
reasonably draw the inference and find, 
in the light of the surrounding circum-
stances shown by the evidence in the 
case, that the person in possession knew 
the property had been stolen. 
412 U.S. at 839-40, 93 S.Ct. at 2360. The 
Court held, "For centuries courts have in-
structed juries that an inference of guilty 
knowledge may be drawn from the fact of 
unexplained possession of stolen goods." 
Id. at 843, 93 S.Ct. at 2362. 
We have accepted approvingly the infer-
ence as a factor in proving guilt in such 
cases as State v. Sessions, Utah, 583 P.2d 
44 (1978), State v. Kirkman, 20 Utah 2d 
44, 432 P.2d 638 (1967), and State v. Mer-
ritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (1926). Cases 
under the federal Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2311-2313, are in agreement, as re-
flected in 15 A.L.R. Fed. 856, 859, which 
generalizes: 
[U]nexplained possession is deemed 
"guilty possession'' . . . and this may 
serve to permit an inference that the 
possessor, whether or not he is shown to 
have been the thief, knew that the ve-
hicle was stolen . . . 
The judgment and sentence are affirmed. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
Theodore HODGES, Plaintiff, 
v. 
WESTERN PILING AND SHEETIN( 
CO., State Insurance Fund, and Indus 
trial Commission of Utah, DefenJanti 
No. 19248. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 14, 1986. 
Workers' compensation claimant ap-
pealed from order of Industrial ComnuV 
sion awarding him partial benefits but de-
nying him permanent total disability bene-' 
fits and reducing his weekly benefit 
amount. The Supreme Court, Hall, GJ., 
held that: (1) computation of benefits for 
claimant on basis of finding that he intend-
ed to work only until he had earned $5,500 
per year was supported by evidence, and 
(2) filling that claimant was not perma-
nently and totally dic J Jed was supported 
oy substantial evidence. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s=*1939.3 
In reviewing questions of fact, Su-
preme Court gives great deference to find-, 
ings of Industrial Commission in workers\ 
compensation cases; only where findings 
are without foundation in evidence will Su-
preme Court reverse. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=3821 
Computation of claimant's workers 
compensation benefits based on finding 
that worker intended to work only until he 
had earned $5,500 per year, which was 
maximum he could earn without reducing 
his Social Security benefits was proper, 
even though claimant was working 40 
hours per week at time of accident and 
earning over $15 per hour. U.C.A.1953> 
35-1-75, 35-l-75(l)(e), (l)(g)(3). 
3. Statutes <S>219(1) 
Where language of statute indicates 
legislative intention to commit broad discre-
tion to agency to effectuate purposes ot 
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JkrisJative scheme, Supreme Court will not 
gubstitute its judgment for that of agency 
long as agency's interpretation has war-
rant in record and reasonable basis in law. 
4 Workers' Compensation ^lGGO 
Finding that 68-year-old worker who 
guffe^d injury to upper right arm as re-
sult of industrial accident and who, follow-
ing the accident, suffered severe flare-up 
of preexisting arthritic condition was not 
permanently and totally disabled was sup-
ported by substantial evidence in workers' 
compensation case. 
Roger D. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
James A. Black, David 
Frank V. Nelson, Gilbert 
Lake City, for defendants. 
L. Wilkinson, 
Martinez, Salt 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Petitioner Theodore Hodges appeals an 
order of the Industria1 Commission that 
awarded petitioner partial benefits undov-
the workers' compensation law, but den^a 
him permanent total disability benefits and 
reduced his weekly benefit amount. We 
affirm. 
Petitioner's upper right arm was injured 
during the course of his employment with 
Western Piling and Sheeting Co. The acci-
dent took place on February 23, 1981. Pe-
titioner was sixty-eight years of age at the 
time of the accident. 
Petitioner had begun receiving social se-
curity retirement benefits at age sixty-five, 
but continued to work forty hours per 
week for Western Piling. He was aware 
that his social security benefits could be 
educed if he earned more than $5,500 per 
annum. 
Following the accident, petitioner was 
hospitalized with a severe flare-up of his 
previously asymptomatic arthritic condi-
gn . On June 20. 1981, he was released 
from the hospital. Shortly thereafter, he 
w
*s readmitted. 
•rrank Dituri, M.D., a medical consultant 
hired by the State Insurance Fund, inter-
v. WESTERN PILING & SHEETING CO. Utah 7 1 9 
Cite as 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986) 
viewed petitioner in the hospital during pe-
titioner's second stay. Dituri concluded 
that petitioner's arthritic condition was a 
preexisting condition not attributable to the 
industrial injury or to an allergy to the 
cortisone treatments petitioner had re-
ceived for the injury. 
Petitioner timely filed his claim for work-
ers' compensation benefits. On March 11, 
1982, a hearing was held and a medical 
panel appointed. The medical panel's re-
port concluded that petitioner was one hun-
dred percent impaired due to the arthritis 
alone, but that the arthritis, although it 
flared up following the industrial injury, 
was not a result cf the injury. The panel 
found that petitioner was thirty-five per-
cent totally impaired, excluding the arthri-
tis: twenty-six percent of the impairment 
was preexisting and nine percent of the 
permanent loss of body function was due to 
the industrial injury. A Division of Reha-
bilitation Services report concluded that pe-
titioner was not a good candidate for reha-
bilitation in view of his age and physical 
impairment. 
The administrative law judge awarded 
petitioner permanent total disability bene-
fits. Following a motion for review by 
defendants, the administrative law judge 
revised his order, finding that petitioner 
was not totally disabled due to the industri-
al accident. The administrative law judge 
also ordered that the weekly benefits paid 
to plaintiff reflect $5,500 per year in earn-
ings ($5,500 divided by 52 weeks), rather 
than earnings of $624 per week (40 hours 
per week at $15.60 per hour). 
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of 
the revised order. The Commission denied 
the motion and affirmed the admini'^rative 
law judge's order. Petitioner then sub-
mitted a petition for review on June 8, 
1983, which was granted by this Court. 
Petitioner's first point on appeal is that 
the administrative law judge erred in the 
manner in which he computed petitioner's 
average weekly wage. The administrative 
law judge computed petitioner's benefits on 
the basis that petitioner was earning $5,500 
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per year. The judge specifically found that 
petitioner 
was, and had b-*en, working only long 
enough each year to reach the maximum 
of $5,500 allowed by the Social Security 
Administration before his social security 
retirement benefits became subject to 
offset by his excess earnings above 
$5,500 [He] had no intention of 
working any longer than necessary to 
earn approximately $5,500. 
[1,2] In reviewing questions of fact, 
this Court gives great deference to the 
Commission's findings. Only where the 
findings are without foundation in the evi-
dence will this Court reverse.1 In this 
case, there was clearly a basis for finding 
that petitioner intended to work only until 
he had earned $5,500. Dr. Dituri, after 
interviewing and examining petitioner, not-
ed that fact specifically in his letter and 
report of consultation to the State Insur-
ance Fund/' Further, at the hearing peti-
tioner himself implied as m u r. in his testi-
mony.3 On the basis of these facts, the 
administrative law judge then determined 
that U.C.A., 1953, § 35-l-75(l)(g)(3) (Supp. 
1985) was the proper subsection to apply in 
determining petitioner's average weekly 
wage.4 The administrative law judge 
found: 
[I]t must ever be borne in mind that the 
basic theory of workmen's compensation 
is not damages but replacement of lost 
income [Petitioner] was and had 
been working only long enough each 
year to reach the maximum of $5,500 
allowed by the Social Security Adminis-
1. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, Utah, 
685 P.2d 1051, 1052 (1984). 
2. Dr. Ditun's letter stated: "For the past few 
years, [petitioner] has been working just enough 
to earn the maximum allowed while on Social 
Security." 
3. The testimony was as follows 
Q. Now since you have been on Social Se-
curity, you have continued to work? Is that 
correct? 
A. Well, you're entitled to work—well, like 
this year I can make $5,500 00 and stay on 
Social Security. 
Q. So you work just enough to— 
tration It is extremely difficult «td 
justify an award of compensation for p ^ 
manent partial impairment based upon 
the state maximum because 52 weeks of 
benefits paid at the rate of $153 per 
week would result in the payment of 
$7,956, which is nearly $1,500 more than 
the applicant would have earned had he 
continued working and the accident hail 
never occurred. Consequently, it seems 
only fair and reasonable to apply the 
provisions of subparagraph [3] of section 
35-1-75.. . . 
Petitioner, however, claims that section^ 
35-l-75(l)(e) indicates the method that; 
should be used to determine petitioner's 
weekly wages since petitioner was working 
forty hours per week at the time of the 
accident. Under the facts of this case, this 
contention is unavailing. 
[3] Where the language of a statute5 
indicates a legislative intention to commit 
broad discretion to an agency to effectuate5 
the purposes of a legislative scheme, this* 
Court will not substitute its judgment fon 
that of the agency as long as the agency's! 
interpretation has warrant in the record 
and a reasonable basis in the law.5 
legislature by enacting section 35-1-75, 
clearly intended the Commission to have, 
some discretion to weigh fairness conf<"dft*M 
ations in fulfilling its role. 
Thus, the question of which subsection ojj 
section 35-1-75 should be applied in a giigj 
en case is a mixed question of law and fact 
on which we defer to the discretion of thfr 
Commission as long as its decision is rea*-
A. I try to keep working, to keep in shape* 
Because if you lay around, you're not going to 
be worth a shit. So 1 try to keep working.'J 
was in good shape, and I tried to keep worJP, 
ing. I could use the money. That's aboUl 
what it amounted to. 
4. Section 35-1-75(1 )(g)(3) states: "If none of W 
methods in subsection (1) will fairly detennM| 
the average weekly wage in a particular casc| 
the commission shall use such other method ^ 
will, based on the facts presented, fairly deter* 
mine the employee's average weekly wage. 
5. Salt Lake City Corp v. Department °f Em£$$ 
ment Sec, Utah, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 ( 1 9 ^ 
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Enable and rational.6 In this case, the 
administrative law judge and the Commis-
sion clearly were within the bounds of dis-
cretion in determining to apply subsection 
(lXg)(3). 
[4] Petitioner also contends that the ad-
ministrative law judge erred in failing to 
find that petitioner v/as permanently and 
totally disabled and in failing to find that 
'petitioner's arthritic condition was a preex-
isting impairment. A determination wheth-
er an individual is permanently and totally 
disabled is a factual question to be resolved 
by the Commission and will not be set aside 
by this Court unless there is no substantial 
evidence in the record to support it.7 In 
this case, there is substantial evidence in 
the record to support the Commission's de-
termination that petitioner was not perma-
nently and totally disabled as a result of 
his work-related injury and the impairment 
preexisting the industrial accident. 
Both the medical panel and petitioner's 
treating physician determined that petition-
er's industrial injury had stabilized as of 
June 23, 1981, and that petitioner was not 
so severely impaired at that time as to be 
found permanently and totally disabled. 
While it is unquestioned that the medical 
panel found petitioner to be one hundred 
percent physically impaired, the panel also 
found that the total impairment was due to 
the onset of severe arthritic problems. As 
the medical panel report stated: 
[Petitioner] would be a hundred percent 
impaired as a result of the arthritis 
alone — The diffuse severe arthritic 
problems had its [sic] onset subsequent 
to the accident of February 23, 1981, but 
was in no way related to those 
events — The total impairment exclud-
*• See Gibson v. Board of Review, Utah, 707 P.2d 
6?5, 676 (1985). 
ILING & SHEETING CO. Utah 7 2 1 
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ing the generalized arthritis is thirty-five 
percent permanent loss of body function. 
The administrative law judge determined 
that under the facts extant petitioner's thir-
ty-five percent permanent loss of body 
function was insufficient to find him per-
manently and totally disabled for the pur-
poses of the workers' compensation stat-
ute. This finding is clearly supported by 
the above evidence. 
Finally, we note that there seems to be 
some discrepancy m the figures used to 
determine the benefits in this case. The 
medical panel found that there was a twen-
ty percent permanent physical impairment 
of plaintiffs upper right arm due to the 
industrial injury. This equates to twelve 
percent of the whole man, although the 
medical panel apparently found that it eq-
ualled nine percent. The medical panel 
then found that plaintiff had twenty-six 
percent permanen 'oss of body 1 unction to 
the whole ™an due to preexisting condi-
tions. The medical panel finally concluded 
that plaintiff had total impairment of thir-
ty-five percent permanent loss of body 
function to the whole man. These figures 
were adopted by the administrative law 
judge. However, these figures do not add 
up, and they should be reexamined for cor-
rectness. 
In all other respects, the judgment of the 
Commission is affirmed. 
STEWART, DURHAM, HOWE and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
7. Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., Utah, 622 P.2d 
790, 792 (1980) (quoting Clark v. Interstate 
Homes, Inc., Utah, 604 P 2d 937 (1979)) 
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surveys were tied, was located in the same 
place during the time the surveys were 
made, therefore, the principle upon which 
defendant rely is inapplicable. Unless 
there is some basis for an estoppel, an ad-
joining landowner can generally by commis-
sioning his own survey, challenge the accu-
racy of the boundary line established by 
another surveyor.4 Under the survey ac-
cepted by the trial court, the boundaries of 
defendants' land coincide in length with 
those in the description in their deed.5 De-
fendants have failed to establish any basis 
upon which they could claim title to a por-
tion of plaintiffs' land. 
[3] Defendants further contend the trial 
court erred in striking the testimony of one 
witness, Christensen. The witness was 
called by defendants to interpret the field 
notes of Aspen Engineering, the surveyor in 
1970. During the trial, defense counsel 
stated that the witness was not called to 
testify as an expe.'i surveyor but as an 
officer of As^n Engineering, who ^ d ac-
cess to the business records, for the witness 
had not participated in the survey. 
The field notes were already in evidence, 
and defense counsel's purpose in calling the 
witness was to have him interpret them. 
Since the witness was neither testifying as 
an expert nor had personal knowledge of 
the survey, the trial court did not err in 
striking his testimony.6 
CROCKETT, C J., and HALL and 
STEWART, JJ„ concur. 
WILKINS, J., heard the argument but 
resigned before the opinion was filed. 
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Harley R. BRUNDAGE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
IML FREIGHT, INC., Special Func of 
Utah, and The Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Defendants. 
No. 16972. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dee. 18, 1980. 
Workers' compensation claimant ap-
pealed from order of the Industrial Com-
mission which determined that he was suf-
fering 30% permanent partial bodily disabil-
ity. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held 
that in face of testimony that claimant was 
unable to sit or stand for any prolonged 
period of time, among other restrictions, 
and that there was no occupation presently 
available to claimant, none of which evi-
dence was contradicted, and in light of fail-
ure of defendants to show that plaintiff 
could obtain or perform the duties of em-
ployment of a special nature, the Commis-
sion could not have formed a bona fide 
opinion that plaintiff was not then incapa-
ble of reentering the labor market by rea-
son of physical disabilities. 
Remanded. 
Hall, J., concurred specially and filed 
opinion. 
1. Workers' Compensation ^ 1939.11(9) 
Determination as to permanent disabil-
ity is factual question for Industrial Com-
mission to resolve, and that determination 
will not be set aside by the Supreme Court 
unless there is no substantial evidence in 
record to support it. U.C.A.19 A 35-1-84, 
35-1-85 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>1377 
In face of evidence that plaintiff was 
unable to sit or stand for any prolonged 
period of time, among other restrictions, 
that all of the restrictions were permanent, 
5. Ovard v Cannon, Utah, 600 P 2d 1246 (1979). 
6. See Rule 56(1), URE 
5 1 
BRUNDAGE v. IML FREIGHT, INC. 
Cite as, Utah, 622 P.2d 790 
Utah 791 
and that based on plaintiff's limitations 
there was no occupation presently available 
to plaintiff, none of which evidence was 
contradicted, it became incumbent upon de-
fendants in workers' compensation case \-> 
show that plaintiff was able to secure em-
ployment of special nature not generally 
available or that he was able to perform 
duties of such employment. 
3. Workers' Compensation <®=*1639 
In face of testimony that plaintiff was 
unable to sit or stand for any prolonged 
period of time, among other restrictions, 
that all of the restrictions were permanent, 
and that there was no occupation presently 
available to plaintiff, none of which evi-
dence was contradicted, and in light of fail-
ure of defendants to show that plaintiff 
could obtain or perform duties of employ-
ment of a special nature, Industrial Com-
mission could not have formed bona fide 
opinion that plaintiff was not then incapa-
ble of reentering the labor market by rea-
son of physical disabilities. U.C.A.1953, 35-
1-67. 
James R. Black of Black & Moore, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Frank V. 
Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert W. Brandt, 
Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
WILKINS, Justice. 
This is an appeal by Plaintiff Harley R. 
Brundage from an order of the Industrial 
Commission which determined that he is 
suffering a 30 percent permanent partial 
bodily disability. Plaintiff maintained be-
fore the Commission and again on appeal 
that he is permanently and totally disabled. 
Plaintiff has spent thirty years of his life 
as a t*uck driver, the most recent 17 of 
which he was employed by Defendant IML 
Freight, Inc. In August of 1975, plaintiff 
injured his back in an accident unrelated to 
his employment. In October of that year, 
he underwent surgery to remove interverte-
bral disc material at the L3-4 level in his 
back. He recovered sufficiently from the 
surgery to pass an Interstate Commerce 
Commission physical examination in Octo-
ber of 1976. He thereafter resumed his 
driving duties for IML. 
On June 18, 1977, plaintiff again injured 
his back while unloading potatoes from his 
truck in Madison, Iowa. He completed his 
scheduled run to Chicago and was flown 
back to Salt Lake City from there the day 
following the accident. On August 1, 1977, 
he again underwent surgery on his back. 
Following the surgery, plaintiff's condition 
steadily improved until December of 1977. 
At that time he reinjured his back after 
catching his heel on a rug in his home. He 
has been unable to return to work since 
then. 
On November 20, 1978, plaintiff filed an 
application for hearing with the Industrial 
Commission. An initial evidentiary hearing 
was held before an Industrial Commission 
administrative law judge on January 25, 
1979. Both plaintiff and a clinical psycholo-
gist, who had examined and tested plaintiff, 
tc if ied. Following that hearing the ad-
ministrative law judge referred plaintiff to 
Rich^id Olsen, a rehabilitation counselor 
with the Division of Rehabilitation Services, 
for the purpose of evaluating plaintiff's po-
tential for rehabilitation and placement in a 
new occupation. 
A second hearing was held on January 14, 
1980. At that hearing two physicians who 
had examined plaintiff testified as to his 
physical condition and impairments. Mr. 
Olsen also testified as to his evaluation of 
plaintiff's prospects for rehabilitation and 
re-employment. Thereafter the administra-
tive law judge entered his findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order finding plain-
tiff 30 percent permanently partially dis-
abled—15 percent of that disability attrib-
utable to nonindustrial causes and 15 per-
cent to industrial causes—and ordered pay-
ment of certain benefits, but specifically 
found that plaintiff was not permanently 
and totally disabled. 
On motion for review filed by plaintiff, 
the entire Commission upheld the adminis-
trative law judge. It did so with one Com-
missioner voting to uphold the order of the 
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administrative law judge, one Commission-
er voting to reverse it and one Commission-
er not participating. 
[1] As this Court recently stated in the 
case of Clark v. Interstate Homes, Inc.:l 
It is fundamental that a determination 
as to permanent disability is a factual 
question for the Commission to resolve, 
and that determination will not be set 
aside by this Court unless there is no 
substantial evidence in the record to sup-
port it, Evans v. Industrial Commission, 
28 Utah 2d 324, 502 P.2d 118 (1972); 
§§ 35-1-84 and 85, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended.2 
In his treatise The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, Professor Arthur Larson 
states: 
"Total disability" in compensation law 
is not to be interpreted literally as utter 
and abject helplessness The task is 
to phrase a rule delimiting the amount 
and character of work a [person] can be 
able to do without forfeiting his totally 
disabled status.3 
Consonant with the view expressed by 
Larson, this Court has adopted the follow-
ing definition of total disability: 
This Court has recognized the principle 
that a workman may be found totally 
disabled if by reason of the disability 
resulting from his injury he cannot per-
form work of the general character he 
was performing when injured, or any oth-
er work which a [person] of his capabili-
ties may be able to do or to learn to 
do 4 
A review of the teFi^mony heard by the 
administrative law juo^e reveals the follow-
ing with respect to plaintiff's physical and 
occupational limitations. Dr. Wayne He-
bertson, a neurologist, testified that plain-
1. Utah, 604 P2d 937 (1979) 
2. la at 938 
3. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensa-
tion, $ 57 51 at 10-107 
4. United Park Ot\ Mines Co v Prescott, 15 
Utah 2d 410, 412, 393 P 2d 800, 801-802 (1964), 
cited in Clark v Interstate Homes Inc, supra, 
tiff is unable to sit or stand for any pro-
longed period of time, is restricted in stoop-
ing or bending, should lift no more than 15 
pounds and is restricted in walking and 
{ twisting. Doctor Hebertson testified that 
all of these restrictions are permanent and 
j that because of the sitting and standing 
restrictions on plaintiff, it was difficult for 
' the doctor to perceive that plaintiff might 
be able to engage even in sedentary voca-
}
 tions. Richard Olsen, the rehabilitation 
counselor, testified that based on plaintiffs 
'» limitations, there is no occupation presently 
' available to plaintiff 
[2, 3] A review of letters from various 
consulting physicians also found in the rec-
s
 ord indicates that they are unanimous in 
1
 believing that plaintiff cannot return to 
being a truck driver Furthermore, some of 
/ these physicians also indicated that they 
considered plaintiff unemployable. In the 
fa o of such eviuence, none of which was 
r contradicted, it tf^n became incumbent 
s upon the defendant to show that plaintiff 
\f "is able to secure employment of a special 
nature not generally available or that he is 
able to perform the duties of such employ-
ment." 5 Defendants adduced no such evi-
dence. Therefore there is no evidence in 
the record to support the finding of the 
5
 administrative law judge that there was 
^ such special employment available to plain-
f tiff. Here, as in the case of Buxton v. 
Industrial Commission* "the Commission 
s
 could not have formed a bona fide opinion 
that plaintiff was not then incapable of 
re-entering the labor market by reason of 
3
 physical disabilities " 7 
The order of the Industrial Commission is 
s reversed Section 35-1-67, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended, prescribes the 
i pro;°dure which is to be followed in cases 
 of permanent disability. That section re-
 quires that: 
at 938 See, also, Caillet v Industrial Commis-
sion, 90 Utah 8, 58 P 2d 760 (1936) 
5. Caillet v Industrial Commission, supra, 90 
Utah at 15, 58 P 2d at 763 
5 6. Utah, 587 P 2d 121 (1978) 
», 
7. Id at 123-124 
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Cite as, Utah, 
a finding by the commission of per-
manent total disability shall in all cases 
be tentative and not final until svch time 
as the following proceedings have been 
had: Where the employee has tentatively 
been found to be permanently and totally 
disabled it shall be mandatory that the 
industrial commission of Utah refer such 
employee to the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of 
education for rehabilitation training 
If and when the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of 
education certifies to the industrial com-
mission of Utah and in writing that such 
employee has fully co-operated with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation in its 
efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the 
opinion of the division the employee may 
not be rehabilitated, then the commission 
shall order that there be paid to such 
employee weekly benefits . . 
The record discloses that plaintiff was 
referred to the Dr *sim of Rehabilitation 
Services for a determination of whether he 
could be rehabilitated. Mr. Olsen testified 
that plaintiff could not be rehabilitated but 
the record does not contain a written certi-
fication of that fact as required by Section 
35-1-67. Further, the question of alloca-
tion between defendant IML and the "spe-
cial fund" of any additional benefits paid to 
plaintiff should be handled according to the 
dictates of Section 35-1-69. 
This matter is accordingly remanded to 
the Commission for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion and the require-
ments of the applicable statutes. Our dis-
position of this matter renders unnecessary 
•iiscussion of the other points raised by 
plaintiff on appeal. No costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, C, J., STEWART, J., and 
KENNETH RIGTRUP, District Judge, con-
cur. 
MAUGHAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
HALL, Justice (concurring specially): 
I agree that it tentatively appears that 
plaintiff may be permanently and totally 
rRUST v. QUINN Utah 7 9 3 
622 P.2d 793 
disabled. However, pursuant to U.C.A., 
1953, 35-1-67, the final determination 
thereof is not to be made until such time as 
plaintiff has fully cooperated with the divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation in its ef-
forts to rehabilitate him. Of course, bene-
fits may only be paid at such time as, in the 
opinion of the division, the employee cannot 
be rehabilitated. 
( ? I KEYNUMBER SYSTEM^ 
UTAH BANK & TRUST, a Utah Corpo-
ration, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
James H. QUINN and James H. Quinn, 
Jr., Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 16788. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 29, 1980. 
Creditor brought action against debtor 
and his guarantor for deficiency judgment 
after sale of debtor's inventory collateral. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Dean E. Conder, J., entered judgment for 
creditor, and debtors appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Wahlquist, District Judge, 
held that: (1) evidence in action by creditor 
for deficiency judgment after sale by credi-
tor of debtor's used-car inventory, including 
fact that book value as applied to debtor's 
inventory was speculative, as the cars « ere 
"exotic," and would only receive book * alue 
if in excellent condition, which they were 
not, was sufficient to support finding that 
the sales were done in a reasonable manner; 
and (2) although creditor did not abide by 
Uniform Commercial Code requirement 
that it give written notice of sales of collat-
eral to debtor, trial court did not err in 
determining, in lieu of automatically bar-
ring creditor from obtaining a deficiency 
judgment for failure to give notice of sales, 
RA 
ADDENDUM 5: 
2 Larson, The Law ot Workmen's Compensation. 
§§ 57.51, 59-22(a) & (b) 
10-164.65 WAGE LOSS VS. MEDICAL INCAPACITY § 57.51(a) 
§ 57.50 Total disability as affected by actual earnings 
§ 57.51 The "odd-lot" doctrine 
§ 57.51(a) Odd-lot cases summarized 
"Total disability" in compensation law is not to be inter-
preted literally as utter and abject helplessness.79-1 Evidence 
Cf. Ifka v. International Smelting & Ref. Co., 188 N.J. Super. 586, 458 
A.2d 126 (1983). Ifka was awarded benefits for 450 weeks, which were to be 
reduced after that time by any earnings she received after that period, ac-
cording to a New Jersey statute. After the 450 weeks, the employer contin-
ued to pay benefits. The court rejected the employer's contention that it was 
entitled to reimbursement for these payments, or to a credit for their amount 
against any future payments payable. Voluntary overpayments, said the 
court, are not recoverable, since the burden is on the employer to ascertain 
the amount of benefits payable after the 450-week period. 
79>1
 Alabama: City of Muscle Shoals v. Davis, 406 So. 2d 919 (Ala. Civ. 
App.), writ denied, 406 So. 2d 923 (Ala. 1981). The plaintiff, who suffered a 
heart attack while collecting garbage for the city, was found permanently 
and totally disabled. Total disability does not mean absolute helplessness. 
Illinois: Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 111. 2d 197, 
28 111. Dec. 548, 390 N.E.2d 907 (1979). The claimant injured his left elbow 
when his arm struck a metal shelf. Following surgery on the elbow, the 
claimant returned to work and attempted to perform a job which required 
only one arm. He felt lightheaded and his arn 7-Aned him, and so he was sent 
home. The next day the workers at Firestone went on strike. During the 
strike the claimant spent two days painting a house. At the compensation 
hearing the arbitrator found that the claimant was entitled to compensation 
for 18 weeks of temporary total disability and a 15% permanent loss of use 
of the left arm. The Industrial Commission affirmed the award of 18 weeks 
temporary disability but increased the award for permanent loss of use of 
the arm to 45%. Firestone, in appeal, argued that the award for temporary 
disability was in error, since the company had provided the claimant with a 
job which could be performed with one arm. The Supreme Court of Illinois 
affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision. The court held that the ex-
tent of permanent disability is a question of fact even if such findings differ 
from those of the arbitrator. The court also held that the testimony that the 
job could be performed with one arm and the evidence that the claimant 
painted a house were not sufficient to overcome the commission's finding of 
temporary disability. Evidence that the claimant can perform useful services 
dr^s not preclude a finding of total disability. 
Nebraska: Wolfe v. American Community Stores, 205 Neb. 763, 290 
(Rel 48-7/86 Pub 340) 
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that claimant has been able to earn occasional wages or per-
form certain kinds of gainful work does not necessarily rule 
out a finding of total disability nor require that it be reduced 
to partial. The task is to phrase a rule delimiting the amount 
and character of work a man can be able to do without forfeit-
ing his totally disabled status. The rule followed by most mod-
ern courts has been well summarized by Justice Matson of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in the following language: 
"An employee who is so injured that he can perform no 
services other than those which are so limited in quality, 
dependability, or quantity that a reasonably stable market 
for them does not exist, may well be classified as totally 
disabled."80 
N.W.2d 195 (1980). Wolfe complained of back pains shortly after moving 
boxes in the store in which she was delicatessen manager. She was found to 
be totally disabled in terms of employability and earning capacity. The court 
rejected a medical expert's definition of total disability as "If you are flat 
on your back, paralyzed, or dead." 
Oregon: Allen v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 71 Or. App. 40, 691 P.2d 137 
(1984). The employee was able to do some light work, vfith the help of his 
wife. But he was independently incapable of anT sustained employment 
90 percent award was raised to total. Treatise quoted. 
Texas:Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 534 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (writ 
refused, no error). A workman was injured when he fell from a ladder at a 
construction site. Although there was evidence that he had done light work 
since the injury, the court held that there was legally sufficient evidence to 
support a jury's finding that the workman was totally and permanently in-
capacitated. Total disability requires that a workman "can no longer secure 
and hold employment for physical labor such as he was required to do prior 
to his injury" and does not require that the workman "be wholly unable to 
do any work at all." 
Utah: Entwistle Co. v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 (Utah 1981). A finding of 
temporary total disability could stand, although during the time in question 
claimant did some work for his own camper company similar to his regular 
work, and took several sales trips. The medical panel had found that he was 
nevertheless substantially disabled during the period for working for an-
other party. Treatise cited. 
Brundage v. IML Freigh , Inc., 622 P.2d 790 (Utah 1980). Treatise 
quoted. 
80
 Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433, 436 (1950). 
(ReU8-7/86 Pub 340) 
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in constant pain, could do no lifting, and could not even be 
comfortable while sitting, was not deprived of a total perma-
nent disability award because of evidence that he had held odd 
jobs parking cars at a garage, helping his wife do laundry 
work, and doing radio repair work. 
The test quoted from the Minnesota opinion and applied in 
these cases is essentially the same as the so-called odd-lot doc-
trine. Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in virtu-
ally every jurisdiction, total disability may be found in the 
case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for 
work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regu-
larly in any well-known branch of the labor market.83 The es-
(Text continued on page 10-164 84(18)) 
injury, the award was improper. On review, the state supreme court noted 
that the worker had previously done only ranch and construction work and 
that he could no longer do this work. Although he was able to perform odd 
jobs, he could not do any job without pain. The court held that, if the evi-
dence showed that the employee could not work without pain, this consti-
tuted substantial evidence of total permanent disability. The court so held 
despite the fact that an orthopedic surgeon had given the employee only a 
5% partial disability rating. The worker's compensation was not limited by 
the specific injury provisions of the statute, nor was the specific injury pro-
vision the exclusive remedy for the worker when he could e^^bhsh total dis-
ability from the loss of a member. Treatise quoted. 
83
 Federal: Odom Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 622 F.2d 110 (5th 
Cir. 1980), cert, dented, 101 U.S. 1482 (1981). A finding of total and perma-
nent disability under LSHWCA was based on physical condition, age, educa-
tion, employment history, rehabilitative potential, and the availability of 
work that claimant could do. A worker, 54 years old with a fourth grade edu-
cation, no formal technical training, and a work history of jobs requiring 
heavy arm work was found to be totally and permanently disabled when an 
accident injured his dominant arm, weakened his grasp, and made it impossi-
ble for him to perform jobs he had performed previously. 
Bath Iron Works Corp v White, 584 F.2d 569 (1st Cir 1978) The Bene-
fits Review Board awarded benefits for permanent partial disability under 
the Longshoremen's Act to a claimant who suffered from asbestosis. His as-
bestosis prevented him from continuing his skilled work as a pipecoverer, 
and required his transfer to a semi-skilled job Since the Board's conclusion 
that the claima i 's disease resulted m an impairment of earning capacity 
was supported viy substantial evidence, the court affirmed the award The 
court rejected the employer's argument that partial disability benefits were 
(Rcl 48-7/86 Pub 340 
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sence of the test is the probable dependability with which 
claimant can sell his services in a competitive labor market, un« 
distorted bjr such factors as business booms, sympathy of a 
particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or the 
superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his crippling 
handicaps.831 
of determining responsibility. After considering the factors listed above, if 
the employee falls into the odd-lot category, the burden of proving the un-
availability of employment should be on the employer. Otherwise, the em-
ployee should be required to show the unavailability of work to someone m 
similar circumstances. The case was remanded with orders that careful con-
sideration be given to these factors. Treatise quoted. 
Wyoming: Cardm v. Momson-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862 (Wyo. 1979). A 
warehouseman appealed a district court's award of benefits of less than five 
percent permanent total disability. The Court held the '*odd-lot" doctrine 
unavailable to the warehouseman because there was evidence that he could 
still perform light or sedentary work. Treatise quoted. 
Big Horn County v. lies, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941). 
England:Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, [1911] 1 K.B. 1009. 
83
 * Cramer v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ariz. App. 379, 507 P.2d 991 (1973). 
As a result of an industrial injury, the claimant, a lineman, had his left arm 
and right leg amputated. He was fitted with prosthetic devices. He was re-
hired by the Salt River Project as a "Grade I Estimator " Ba^ad on brs 
post-i^iury earnings, the commission determined that the claimant had suf-
fered w 41.4% loss of earning capacity, instead of the 100% loss pre^ ..ned by 
statute. The claimant argued that the commission erred m basing his future 
earning capacity entirely upon one post-injury occupation, rather than re-
quiring the carrier to present evidence as to what his services were worth m 
the open labor market. The court held that, where an injured workman has 
post-injury earnings, lack of evidence of employabihty by other employers 
does not by itself preclude a finding of earning capacity. The evidence here 
was clear that the employee's post-injury earnings were not subject to fac-
tors such as the sympathy of his employer, business booms or temporary 
good luck, which would preclude the commission from considering those 
earnings m determining the claimant's post-injury earning capacity at a 
41.1% loss. Treatise quoted. 
Lister v. Walker, 409 So 2d 1153 (Fla. App 1982) The claimant, a 70-
year-old man, had been receiving permanent total disability benefits of $24 
per week since 1968 as the result of an amputated leg and medical problems 
which precluded his use of a prosthesis. He found a job, watching over a 
state park on the ranger's day off, which paid him $300 a month The in-
surer then terminated his benefits, contending that, since he was working, he 
(Rel 48-7/86 Pub t O 
59 
2 Larson, The Law ot Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 59-22(a) & (b) 
§ 59.22(a) DISABILITY AND BENEFITS 10-376 
apply in such cases, nor in any case in which the prior condi-
tion was not a disability in the compensation sense.36 For ex-
(Text continued on page 10-391) 
agreed to accept compensation for a 10% permanent partial disability of his 
back. 
Pennsylvania: Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 43 Pa. 
Cmwlth. 480, 402 A.2d 725 (1979). Two claimants were awarded compensa-
tion for total and permanent disability due to coal workers' pneumoconiosis. 
Since the appeals of their employer raised the same issue, the Commonwealth 
Court consolidated the cases for argument. One of the claimants had suf-
fered from arteriosclerotic heart disease, which totally disabled him. The 
other had undergone coronary by-pass surgery, which disabled him. The ref-
eree had ruled that, subsequent to these disabilities, each had become totally 
disabled by coal workers' pneumoconiosis. The employer's argument on ap-
peal was that the pre-existing disability precluded a finding of later total 
disability from the occupational disease. The court held that, notwithstand-
ing a prior disability, a claimant can be awarded total disability based upon 
an occupational disease. 
36
 Federal:Boyd-Campbell Co. v. Shea, 254 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Tex. 1966). 
Claimant suffered from preexisting congenital anomalies of the spine, which 
were aggravated by a compensable back injury. As a result, claimant was 
found to be permanently and totally disabled. Prior to the accident, claimant 
had not been disabled to any extent due to the congenital anomalies. The 
court held that apportionment under 33 U.S.C. § 908(f)(1) (1965) was not 
^pplicabb, since the preexisting condition was not a previous disability. 
Shillington v. W.J. Jones & Son, Inc., 1 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. 191 (1974). 
In Hie absence of a showily that a claimant's preexisting conditions, such as 
a previous stroke and alcoholic episodes, were disabling prior to the injury at 
issue, Section 8(f) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, apportioning disabilities, is inapplicable. 
Alabama:Lewis v. 4-E Corp., 469 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 1985). When a preexist-
ing arteriosclerotic condition had not affected claimant's ability to work, and 
employment exertion rendered the condition symptomatic, it was error to 
apportion any part of the resultant 10 percent permanent partial disability 
to the preexisting weakness. Treatise cited. 
Kroger Co. v. Millsap, 280 Ala. 531, 196 So. 2d 380 (1967). Claimant had a 
preexisting condition in her back, but it was dormant until acted upon by an 
industrial accident. Held, apportionment was not applicable, since the condi-
tion had not been causing any disability prior to the accident. 
Thompson & Co. Contractors v. Cole, 391 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1980). 
Arizona:I&% Moor Contracting Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 61 Ariz. 52, 143 
P.2d 888 (1943). The prior condition must be "something that affects his 
earning power." 
(Rel 50-3/87 Pub 340) 
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ample, in Eagle Indemnity Company v. Hadley,37 the claimant 
Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Savell, 348 S W 2d 202 (Tex. App. 1961) The 
employer alleged that the claimant's disability resulted from a previous in-
jury. The court held that the jury should be instructed to consider whether 
the disability was solely caused by a prior injury or partially caused by a 
prior injury. 
Jones v. Travelers Ins. Co., 374 S.W 2d 779 (Tex App. 1964) (writ re-
fused). When claimant is partially disabled because of preexisting condition, 
the jury is to find the degree of incapacity attributable to this preexisting 
condition, for apportionment purposes However, it was improper to submit 
a question to the jury asking them to determine the degree of disability 
caused "solely" by the injury presently m question 
McGowen v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 205 F 2d 533 (5th Cir 1953) Er-
ror under Texas statute to instruct the jury that it should deduct from dis-
ability found, any disability caused by previous injury, physical condition, 
or disease. 
Cf. Brinkley v Liberty Mut. Ins Co., 331 S W 2d 423 (Tex Civ. App 
1959). Evidence was submitted to the jury that the claimant had previously 
been awarded over $10,000 for 10 separate injuries resulting in a total of 
seven months time lost from work. The court held that only those prior inju-
ries which directly contributed to the disability resulting from the latest in-
jury could be considered by the jury and then for apportionment purposes 
only. Reversed and remanded. 
West Virginia:Daniels v State Workmen's Comp Comm'r, 294 S.E.2d 184 
(W. Va. 1982). Claimant was injured when a large rock struck his knee. His 
claim was t'*"nd compensable After treatment for the knee injury had oe~ 
gun, claimant's physician discovered that some amount of arthritis preex-
isted the claimant's occupational injury The court found that medical testi-
mony was neither sufficient to establish that the arthritic condition was m 
fact disabling nor determinative as to the degree of the preexisting disabil-
ity. The court held that, when there is a preexisting ascertainable physical 
impairment arising from a nomndustrial injury, such preexisting impair-
ment cannot be deducted~fforrrthe claimant's present permanent partial dis-
ability award, unless the preexisting impairment is both definite and dis-
abling. Treatise quoted. 
But cf. Bannister v State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 154 W Va. 
172, 174 SE.2d 605 (1970) Claimant had preexisting asthma and emphy-
sema which combined with occupational silicosis to render him permanently 
totally disabled. The court held that since the prior condition was not the re 
suit of an injury, and was not a compensable occupational disease, claimant 
was not entitled to total disability benefits, and was limited to that portion of 
the disability caused by the silicosis 
37
 70 Ariz. 179, 218 P 2d 488 (1950) 
(Rel 50-3/87 Pub 340) 
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was a man sixty-six years of age, whose disability after a fall 
consisted of (1) limitation of spinal motion, (2) limitation of 
shoulder motion, (3) impaired eyesight, (4) impaired hearing, 
(5) arthritis in both hands, (6) frequent urination at night, (7) 
cramps and poor circulation in fset and legs, (8) low back 
pains, (9) dizzy spells, (10) gall bladder attacks, and (11) ex-
cessive night sweats. In this appalling catalog of infirmity, 
only items (1) and (2) were directly produced by the fall; the 
rest were due to "normal physiological degenerating processes 
not referable to the injury," although the degeneration might 
have been accelerated somewhat by the injury. The undisputed 
fact remains that claimant, up to the fall, had been working 
steadily and, for all that appears, would have continued to do 
so indefinitely but for the accident. In short, there was no ap-
portionable "disability" prior to the accident. The principle 
that degeneration and infirmities due to age which have not 
previously produced disability are not a proper basis for re-
duction of compensation is amply supported by authorities 
from other jurisdictions.38 
§ 59.22(b) Prior condition as independent cause of part or all oC disability 
Of course, the matter is entirely different the degenera-
tive condition is itself the cause of the disability for which 
compensation is claimed, quite apart from the effect of the in-
38
 Furlong v. Northwestern Casket Co., 190 Minn. 552, 252 N.W. 656 
(1934). 
Duprey v. Maryland Cas. Co., 219 Mass. 189,106 N.E. 686 (1914). 
Udell v. Wagner, Peterson & Wilson, 2 Cal. Ind. Ace. Comm'n 139, 11 
N.C.C.A. 58 (1915), note. 
M.D. Thompson & Son Co. v. McCuan, 255 Ark. 762, 502 S.W.2d 93 
(1973). Evidence that the 68-year-old claimant had worked on a farm and in 
logging prior to a spinal fracture, and after injury was unable to perform 
any remunerative services, supported a finding that total disability was 
caused by injury rather than age. 
(Rel ."n 3/87 Pub 340) 
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dustrial accident.39 Thus, it may be found on the facts of a 
particular case that after the period of temporary disability 
caused by the accident was completed, any subsequent long-
range disability stemmed entirely from a preexisting mfir-
39
 Arizona- Scherer v Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ariz 224, 349 P 2d 786 
(1960) The claimant was injured when he slipped on a catwalk, striking his 
head and twisting his neck Medical testimony indicated that other physical 
disabilities which prompted termination of the employment showed no causal 
relation to the accident but were degenerative changes incident to age Com-
pensation denied 
Murphy v Industrial Comm'n, 20 Ariz App 21, 509 P 2d 1058 (1973) 
The claimant, who had an arthritic right hip joint, sustained an industrially-
related accident when she strained the adductor muscles of her right leg 
Three physicians were consulted The conclusions of the consultation were 
that she had a preexisting degenerative joint disease ^hich activated the in-
dustrial injury, but that her present working disability was due to the preex-
isting arthritis and not to her injury The court held that this medical testi-
mony supported the industrial commission's finding of an absence of any 
physical residual impairment causally related to the accident 
Payton v Industrial Comm'n, 27 Ariz App 92, 551 P 2d 82 (1976) The 
claimant injured his knee at work Although still planning on future surgery 
which would result in full temporary and permanent benefits, the claimant 
returned to his old job at full pay As a result, his benefits were terminated 
While m this condition, the claimant suffered a non industrial accident to 
his back and Kie<» that rendered him r^apable of returning to work The 
claimant filed a claim for the potential future benefits that he most likely 
would have received but for the second mjurv The court denied benefits, 
stating that there was no hard evidence from which to arrive at a certain fig-
ure or any figure at all 
Louisiana Stogner v American Motorists Ins Co , 123 So 2d 655 (La 
App 1960) A carpenter suffered a 15 percent permanently disabling injury 
to his shoulder The court found that the occasional pams and mabiliU to do 
heavy work were caused not by the accident but by a preexisting arthritic 
condition Compensation for total disability denied and the 15 percent award 
affirmed 
New York Small v Jo-Lee Household Outfitting Co , 44 A D 2d 738, 354 
N Y S 2d 456, appeal denied, 34 N Y 2d 517, 358 N Y S 2d 1027, 316 N E 2d 
352 (1974) The court held that where the claimant's disability was the 
result of multiple disabling causes—in this case permanent injuries from an 
automobile accident m the course of his employment and Huntingdon s Cho-
rea (a progressive neurological disease)—and where there was an abundance 
of divergent medical testimony, the apportionment of causality (here 33V3% 
causally related disability) was within the pro\mce of the board 
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mity.40 
The essential distinction at stake here is between a preexist-
ing disability that independently produces all or part of the fi-
40
 Anzona: Arellano v. Industrial Commission, 25 Ariz. App. 598, 545 P.2d 
446 (1976). The claimant injured his back at work. He had had a preexisting, 
but previously asymptomatic, degenerative arthritis of the spine. The indus-
trial injury aggravated the arthritis. Although the back injury subsided, the 
arthritic condition persisted, making him unable to work. The court held 
that the claimant would not be entitled to permanent disability benefits, be-
cause he had failed to show that the industrial injury was a continuing fac-
tor contributing to the arthritic pam. He would be able, however, to collect 
compensation for the period during which the injury aggravated the condi-
tion. 
Florida:Cmtas Corp. v. Price, 424 So. 2d 900 (Fla. App. 1982). The claim-
ant injured his back and neck m a noncompensable automobile accident. Sub-
sequent to his "maximum medical improvement" he remjured his back m a 
compensable industrial accident. The court reversed an award of compensa-
tion because 1) the claimant's testimony alone was not competent evidence of 
an accident-related permanent impairment; 2) the existing medical testimony 
at no time indicated that the claimant's final permanent impairment ex-
ceeded 5%, which was the extent of damage following the first accident In 
short, the claimant's condition had remained unchanged. 
Louisiana: Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co , 308 So 2d 489 
(La. App. 1975). The claimant was injured while worKing on a construction 
site, when a truck forced his fall from an ab'Jment wall. Thereafter h* re-
ceived compensation benefits. He petitioned for permanent and total bene-
fits, asserting that the accident caused permanent disability from rheuma-
toid arthritis. The court denied any further award of benefits. It stated that, 
while the accident could have precipitated an attack of arthritis, it could not 
have caused the condition to arise. Medical testimony indicated that the 
claimant had suffered from an arthritic condition in the past. 
Michigan: See also Howard v. General Motors Corp., 132 Mich. App. 639, 
348 N.W.2d 286, remanded on other grounds, 419 Mich. 948, 357 N.W 2d 643 
(1984). The court found that claimant's disability stemmed from his first 
work-related injury to his back m the early 1960's, which was aggravated by 
several subsequent work-related injuries. Claimant's intervening non-woik-
related heart disease, which also precluded his continued employment, did 
not justify denying him benefits for his work-related injury. 
Texas: Leget v. Aetna Cas. & Sur Co., 346 S.W 2d 956 (Tex App 1961) 
(writ refused). The jury could find that the employee's total, temporary dis-
ability for 47 weeks was dut solely to the injuries, but any disability thereaf-
ter was due solely to the r reexistmg conditions caused by arthritis and a de-
generative disc disease. Award affirmed for the temporary period. 
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nal disability,41 and a pre-existing condition that in some way 
combines with or is acted upon by the industrial injury. 
{Text continued on page 10-398) 
41
 Arizona: Ko^m v. Industrial Comm'n, 143 Ariz. 118, 692 P.2d 297 (Ct. 
App. 1984). Treatise cited. 
Circle K. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 134 Ariz. 51, 653 P.2d 699 (Ct. 
App. 1982). Claimant had preexisting back and leg usuries that had been 
caused by polio. Subsequently, he aggravated his back condition m an indus-
trial accident. The court interpreted the apportionment formula m Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1065(A)(4), and held that the special fund was liable 
for the amount of compensation attributable to ''the preexisting general 
physical functional disability." The statute required a showing of "forty 
percent or more general physical functional disablement." All of claimant's 
previous injuries were considered as part of his combined disability even 
though some of the injuries had not been aggravated by the industrial acci-
dent. 
Cf. Lazann v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ariz. 369, 661 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 
1983). Where there is evidence of independent disability from a pre-existing 
condition and an industrial injury not affecting the previous condition, the 
Industrial Commission must make findings regarding the extent of disabil-
ity from each source. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed Ihe Commission's 
denial of partial disability compensation for a back injury sustained on the 
job. The denial was based on a finding that the plaintiff was 100 percent dis-
abled from bronchial asthma, a pre-existing condition which was not aggra-
vated by the back injury. The Commission had failed to make any determina-
tion, as it was required to do, of the loss of earning capacity that was solely 
related to the industrial injury without regard tc the impairment due to the 
n ^-industrial injury. The plaintiff had shown that his mduc.nal injury 
prevented him from returning to his former job, that he had a permanent 
partial disability resulting from the injury, and that he had made a good 
faith effort to find other work. 
California: Gay v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 96 Cal. App 3d 555, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 137 (1979). Apportionment on the basis of preexisting psychiatric con-
dition was annulled because the expert opinion on which it was based was not 
properly related to legal standards. Apportionment requires that the normal 
progression of the preexisting condition would have produced the disability 
m the absence of the industrial injury. The court said* 
We do not comprehend how the parties can expect any physician to 
properly report in workers' compensation matters unless he is advised of 
the controlling legal principles. Physicians are trained to discover the 
etiology of an illness. Finding the cause is important in preventative 
medicine and curing illness once developed (Duthie, supra, 86 Cal 
App.3d at pp. 728-729, 150 Cal Rptr. 530.) Legal apportionment is not 
identical to theories of medical causation Physicians in workers' com-
pensation matters must accordingly be e'l'icated by the parties on the 
correct legal standards of apportionment. 158 Cal Rptr. at 141. 
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